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This thesis argues that the Baltic Sea region still faces significant security
challenges in the post-Cold War era. In particular, nations in the region confront a
"cooperative security dilemma." Baltic Sea countries are adopting a range of cooperative
agreements to strengthen their security. By doing so, however, they may risk alienating
other nations that are left out of those agreements, and thereby create an unstable security
environment. This thesis examines the nature of the cooperative security dilemma in the
Baltic Sea region, and analyzes how Baltic Sea nations can cooperate in the future
without posing a threat to other nations, including Russia. This thesis argues that the
Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) program offers a model of future security
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The need for the current thesis stems from the new security environment which
emerged in Europe in the early 1990s. The northern part of Europe, and particularly the
Baltic Sea region, need new guarantees for a stable security environment, and it would be
desirable if these new guarantees could be based on cooperation rather than conflict as in
the past. At the same time, several threats to security exist as continuing challenges from
historical periods or as new potential threats. This thesis examines new mechanisms of
cooperation in the region. At present conflicts are latent and not manifested in any combat
in the region. Even very peaceful regions may face considerable threats, however, and
they sometimes expand into serious conflicts.
Robert Jervis, describing the phenomenon of the "security dilemma," warns that
an increase in one state's security can decrease the security of others (Jervis, 1978, 169).
Referring to the post-Cold War security environment, it is appropriate to modernize
Jervis's definition and to develop new concepts. We are facing a post-Cold War
cooperative security dilemma. In this situation, when states cooperate to decrease their
security fears, they may risk alienating nations that remain outside of those cooperative
security arrangements,and thereby create an unstable security environment. This thesis
examines how this argument applies to the security environment in the Baltic Sea region,
and analyzes measures to resolve the security dilemma. In particular, this thesis argues
that there are still considerable security dilemmas in the Baltic Sea region. The security
interests of the majority of the Baltic Sea countries differ from the interests of Russia,
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which is the strongest regional military power. Solutions for the Baltic security dilemma
may be found through the elaboration of cooperative security arrangements in the region.
In particular, the thesis tries to identify how to solve the security dilemma, and promote
security and defense cooperation in the Baltic Sea region in the near future, considering
political and military preferences and prospects of the Baltic Sea countries.
The 1990s have offered to European countries a range of new cooperative security
options. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program allowed the inclusion of non-members
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into NATO's security cooperation.
Several initiatives to strengthen Europeanization in the region by the European Union
(EU) or Western European Union made cooperation more flexible in the framework of
these organizations. The case study of the BALTSEA program points out one additional
way to establish an appropriate cooperative security arrangement to escape from the
security dilemma. New dimensions of the Council of the Baltic Sea States have
contributed to the development of regional security and defense cooperation. There is no
need to establish new regional security organizations in the Baltic Sea region; the process
of regionalization can be developed within the framework of existing organizations with
more success.
The post-Cold war security challenges on the Baltic Sea are based to a great extent
on the security environment shaped in the period of Cold War. There are basically four
security issues in the Baltic Sea region:
• The Baltic question . The Baltic states have often remained in sphere of influence of
their stronger neighbors. However, the decrease of conflictual basis in international
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relations and a general orientation toward cooperation reduces the need to establish
"buffer-zones."
• Instability of Russia . Russian instability is probably the main security concern in the
region. If democracy ultimately wins in Russia, and Russia becomes stable, it efforts
to create a "zone of peace" in the Baltic Sea region will become a reality. If Russian
democracy collapses, the security environment could become very tense.
• Arms control issues . Russia has demanded reservations concerning the CFE treaty
which could increase Russia's military presence and capability in the region.
• Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) area. This is Russia's highly militarized enclave in the
Baltic Sea region. It raises security concerns not only in neighboring Poland and
Lithuania, but in the all countries of the region. There is no practical need to preserve
Russia's military outpost outside her main territory in the era of cooperation and
mutual interdependence.
In theory, cooperative security arrangements can help deal with these security
issues by giving Baltic Sea countries an additional source of security. In practice,
however, Russian reactions to enhancement of these security arrangements - especially
NATO enlargement - are a potential source of concern. The enlargement of cooperative
security arrangements cannot be stopped in the Baltic countries without harming regional
security. As the BALTSEA program suggests, however, it should be possible to pursue
these arrangements without creating a severe regional security dilemma involving Russia.
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The effectiveness of cooperative security arrangements depends on involvement
of all interested actors in regional peace. The Baltic Sea region is a security complex
where the security of individual countries depends on the security of other countries
belonging to this complex. This is one reason why all the countries in the region must
cooperate with each other in minimizing threats to the regional peace. The involvement of
Transatlantic and European security arrangements on the Baltic Sea may produce a
positive outcome, balancing the power of individual actors such as Russia that might
destabilize the security environment. At the same time, the enlargement of these security
arrangements to Russia, as much as possible, makes Russia also responsible for stability
and peace in the region.
xvi
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Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as a situation in which "an increase in
one state's security decreases the security of others." (Jervis, 1978, p. 169). How does this
argument apply to the Baltic security environment in the post-Cold War era? Which
measures could be necessary to resolve the situation of the security dilemma described by
Jervis? These are the main questions that will be examined in this work. Today, we are
facing the post-Cold War's cooperative security dilemma, which differs in some ways
from the meaning given by Jervis. According to the cooperative security dilemma, as
some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, it could decrease the
security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative
security arrangements.
This thesis argues that there are still considerable security dilemmas in the Baltic
Sea region. The security interests of the majority of the Baltic Sea countries differ to
some extent from the interests of the strongest regional military power, Russia. Solutions
for the Baltic security dilemmas may be found through the elaboration of cooperative
security elements in the region. Security and defense institutions such as NATO and
WEU offer many opportunities for promoting peace and stability in the Baltic Sea region.
The BALTSEA program points out one additional way to establish an appropriate
cooperative security arrangement to escape from the security dilemma.
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The need for the current work stems from the new security environment that
emerged in Europe in the early 1990s. The northern part of Europe, and particularly the
Baltic Sea region, need new guarantees for a stable security environment. It would be
desirable if these new guarantees could be based on cooperation rather than conflict as in
the past. At the same time, several latent threats to security exist as continuing challenges
from historical periods or as new potential threats.
The regional peace in the Baltic Sea region is influenced by a cooperative security
dilemma. It is obvious that the elements of this security dilemma tend to be related to
Russia, which is the only unstable democracy in the region today. Additionally, Russia is
not involved in the majority of cooperative security arrangements and neither is it an
active participant in regional PfP cooperation. The Russian security threat from Russia is
also emphasized by cultural differences between Russia and other Baltic Sea nations.
The dependent variable of this thesis is the effectiveness of regional security
cooperation in contributing to a stable security environment on the Baltic Sea. My two
independent variables are the security environment in the Baltic Sea region, and the
different kinds of cooperative and collective security arrangements as presented in Table
1.
Table 1. Independent Variables
Security environment on the Baltic Sea. Nordic countries; Baltic countries;
Germany, Russia, Poland.
Cooperative and collective security
arrangements in the Baltic Sea region.
NATO/PfP, EUAVEU, neutrality and non-
alignment, regional security options
(including bilateral cooperation, regional
projects like BALTSEA, and so forth).
The effectiveness of cooperative security arrangements depends on involvement
of all interested actors in the regional peace. The Baltic Sea region is a security complex
where the security of individual countries depends on the security of other countries
belonging to this complex. This is one reason why all the countries in the region must
cooperate with each other in minimizing threats to the regional peace. The involvement of
Transatlantic and European security arrangements on the Baltic Sea may produce a
positive outcome, balancing the power of individual actors such as Russia that might
destabilize the security environment. At the same time, the enlargement of these security
arrangements to Russia, as much as possible, makes Russia also responsible for stability
and peace in the region.
B. BACKGROUND
The current European security dilemma includes two aspects. First, Europe is not
ready to give up U.S. participation in European security architecture. Second, there is an
obvious need to strengthen the European role in its own defense. There are parallel trends
under way in the European political landscape: Europeanization and regionalization.
Nordic political scientists Pertti Joenniemi and Ole Waever stress that
Europeanization takes three forms:
• Classical interstate cooperation especially in the field of security,
and in relation to the two semi-European states, USA and
Russia/Soviet Union, in NATO and especially in the [OSCE].
• Creation of a superstate, the [EU] which takes on a number of state-
like traits without ever becoming a nation-state or just a normal
sovereign state.
• The emergence of substate and around-state structures, especially
with German Lander and other regions, with business and all kinds
of networks. (Joenniemi and Waever in Wellmann, 1992, p. 28)
The second tendency influencing present-day Europe is a process of
regionalization. The importance of regional cooperation and regional security has grown
rapidly. The overall tendency in the contemporary European politics is cooperation-
oriented, and terms like conflict prevention, crisis management or peace operations are
new in modern security issues. Regionalization could be seen as a parallel process to
Europeanization, developed within the framework of a larger unification, not as an
alternative or opposite movement to it.
The Baltic Sea region can be defined on two dimensions. The geographical
dimension includes Germany (regionally Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Hamburg, Bremen), Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Russia (regionally St.Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Karelia), and Poland (regionally
Northern Poland including Gdansk and Szczeczin). The political dimension includes all
the members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).
The Council of the Baltic Sea States was founded in 1992 by Danish-German
initiative, and its members belong to at least five, sometimes overlaping, geopolitical
areas - Nordic countries (Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland); Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); Western-European countries (Germany); Central-
European countries (Poland); and the CIS members (Russia). Of course, the Nordic
countries could be at the same time referred to as the Western-European countries, and
the Baltic countries as the Central-European countries. Table 2 below gives a general
overview of the Baltic Sea States.
Table 2. Basic Facts of the Baltic Sea States'
Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Iceland Latvia Lithuania Norway Poland Russia Sweden
Area (km2) 43094 45226 337030 356910 103000 64100 655200 324220 312683 17075200 449964




GDP per 22700 5560 19000 20400 19800 3800 3870 26200 6400 5200 20800














Main trade GER FIN GER FRA UK RUS RUS UK GER GER GER
partners SWE RUS SWE NED GER GER GER GER ITA USA UK
1996 UK SWE UK ITA USA SWE UKR SWE RUS ITA USA
Ethnic DAN EST FIN GER ICE LAT LIT NOR POL RUS SWE
composition 95,8% 63.9% 92,9% 91,2% 95,9% 55.1% 81,4% 96.3% 98,7% 81,5% 89,3%
1994-1996 RUS SWE TUR RUS RUS FLN







Major Lutheran Lutheran Lutheran Lutheran Lutheran Lutheran Roman Lutheran Roman Russian Lutheran
religion Catholic Catholic Orthodox
1 Data of the table comes from CIA Factbook J 997; available
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook , Internet and Encyclopedica Britannica: Nations of the
World; available: http://www.eb.com: 1 80/wld , Internet.
Although Norway and Iceland do not belong geographically to the region, their
security interests are strongly connected with it. Also the Danish territories, the Faroe
Islands and Greenland, and Aland Islands belonging to Finland should be considered as
parts of the extended region. Referring to the Baltic Sea Region, it is necessary to
determine its meaning in respect to other geopolitical terms, often used in the same
context. Northern Europe includes the Baltic Sea region but also the European part of the
Arctic. Scandinavia or Baltics are actually subregions of the Baltic Sea region. Therefore
we can distinguish three levels of geopolitical regions (as it is described in Table 3).
Table 3. Northern Europe
Level Geopolitical region Countries
First level Northern Europe














Germany, Poland, and Lithuania also belong to the Central-European geopolitical
region, and simultaneously form the Central-European part of the Baltic Sea region.
6
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter II deals with the questions connected to international relations theory and
creates the theoretical background of the thesis. This chapter examines changes which
influenced the world development after the end of the Cold War. It also analyzes the
concepts central to the thesis: the security dilemma, regionalization, and cooperation.
Chapters HI and IV give a general political, cultural, and historical overvof the region,
and focus on several issues connected with conflict and cooperation around the Baltic
Sea. These issues involve Nordic cooperation, Baltic cooperation, and the Lithuanian-
Polish relationship. These chapters examine two great powers in the region - Germany
and Russia. The Baltic dilemma, which caused many conflicts in the past, is examined in
Chapter IV. Two other issues, which emerged during recent years, are the destiny of arms
control agreements in the context of the region, and specific problems connected with the
Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) area. Chapter V examines a case study concerning the
prospects for regional cooperation and international defense assistance to the Baltic
states, particularly the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) program. The last chapter
examines the role of different institutions in accordance with future security options for
the region.

II. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE MODERN ERA
A. SECURITY DILEMMA
According to a well-known definition of the security dilemma, given by Robert
Jervis,2 a security dilemma is present in a situation where "an increase in one state's
security decreases the security of others." (Jervis in Williams et al., 1994, p. 197). The
anarchy in international politics causes the fear that competing powers can threaten a
state's sovereignty and creates the basis for the emergence of a security dilemma.
Features characterizing Jervis' s security dilemma include self-help and an anarchic
international system.
The causes of war are closely connected with the security dilemma. Actually, the
security dilemma represents a modern variant to Thucydides' classical definition of the
causes of war: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear
this caused in Sparta." (Thucydides in Williams et al., 1994, p. 184). This indicates that
the security dilemma already existed in Ancient Greece. Michael Howard has offered the
same judgement in his essay "The Causes of War." "The causes of war remain rooted, as
much as they were in the pre-industrial age, in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of
hostile power and the fears of restriction, if not the extinction, of their own." (Howard,
2 The basic concept of the security dilemma was initially discussed by John H. Hertz in his
"Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January 1950). Jervis' s definition
is, however, the most widely used.
1984, p. 18). The similarity of definitions suggests that the security dilemma has
remained the main reason for the emergence of wars.
In the past, the Warsaw Pact organization dominated the Baltic Sea, including the
former Soviet Union, Poland, and East-Germany. NATO countries (Denmark and West-
Germany) had limited access to the Baltic Sea, and neutral Sweden and Finland were as
buffer-zones between two military blocs. We have to face now a totally changed security
environment now, which has created new chances to aspire to a more stable political
climate. Under the present-day security conditions, it is mistaken and possibly dangerous
to create an artificial bipolar situations again. It will be more useful to seek large security
arrangements in the multipolar world, which promote cooperation between democratized
countries rather than stress a possible conflict as in the past when great powers tried to
achieve balance of power between themselves. Differently from the past, the new security
environment deals with threats, not with enemies.
As a point of departure, this paper will consider the model of the security dilemma
as constructed by Jervis. This model was relevant for a long time to the Northern
European security environment. Referring to the post-Cold War security environment, it
is appropriate to modernize Jervis's definition and to develop the concept of a
cooperative security dilemma. It is obvious that the security dilemma described by Jervis
did not disappear with the Cold War but now has new dimensions. "The security dilemma
identified by Jervis has become inverted with the end of the Cold War." (Sperling and
Kirchner, 1997, p. 8). The cooperative security dilemma is in accordance with the modern
trend of institutionalization that is as some states cooperate in decreasing their security
fears, it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained
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outside of the cooperative security arrangements. At least in some circumstances,
isolationism in the modern era creates offensive security options, while cooperation is
mainly defense-oriented. NATO enlargement is related to the cooperative security
dilemma. Countries try to avoid being left in a "gray zone" between potential adversaries,
and make attempts to protect their security interests in the framework of collective
security and defense institutions.
However, cooperation itself can reduce the security dilemma, and the shared
threat stimulates cooperation between countries. According to Jervis, "There is rough
proportionality between the magnitude of the conflict with the enemy and the strength of
the unifying force generated. Relatedly, the more deeply two countries are divided from
each other, the greater external threat that will be required to bring them together."
(Jervis, 1997, pp. 222-223).
Different interests stress competition in any security complex. Any competition
may be able to promote a serious interstate conflict that makes the entire region unstable.
The Baltic Sea region, which was a typical example of bipolar competitiveness in the
past, has recently turned into a cooperation-oriented low conflict area. Security and
defense cooperation and collective security are effective tools to avoid the emergence of
the security dilemma. Both of the processes, characterizing the political tendencies in
Europe today, Europeanization and regionalization, are helpful to avoid the negative
consequences of the security dilemma. Europeanization creates a space for a joint security
environment, which is protected by collective defense organizations such as NATO and
the WEU, which may be used as instruments of collective security.
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The NATO enlargement is a typical example of cooperative security dilemma. It
seems that the main obstacle to this process are misperceptions concerning Russia. The
involvement of Russia with appropriate cooperative security arrangements offers a
solution for resolving the security dilemma. At the same time, NATO-Russia partnership
should not decrease the security of other countries in the region. Therefore, we have to
avoid the offering of secial status for Russia, and try to establish such arrangements
which treat Russia as equal partner in the particular security complex.
B. COOPERATION AND SECURITY
Security does not solely depend on the will and actions of individual actors. This
circumstance makes finding solutions for security dilemmas extremely complicated. "As
Martin Wight pointed out, security - in contrast with power - need not be a 'relational
concept,' whereby 'the security of one power is in inverse ratio to that of others...
Security consists in other factors besides national power: the strength and reliability of
allies, and the absence of conflicting interests, for example... Security, like prosperity, is
an objective towards which all powers can, conceivably, move simultaneously'." (Wight
in Yost, 1998, p. 292).
The world before the 1990s regarded conflict between different national interests
as an unavoidable aspect of interstate relations. The security environment forced states to
find allies and create alliances as the only way to succeed in the interstate competition.
An alliance is not a collective security agreement. A collective security
arrangement is an inclusive institution: it commits the members to oppose
any act of aggression, even one committed by one of its members. By
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contrast, alliances are exclusive institutions: they entail a commitment to
support the other members against states outside the community. Although
members of an alliance may also be part of a collective security
organization and may engage in other forms of security cooperation,
failure to keep these concepts distinct can lead to misleading analyses and
muddy policy-making. (Walt, 1997, p. 158)
The modern era has introduced terms like cooperative security and collective
security, which co-exist with a traditional security cooperation model, an alliance.
Cooperation is the main basis of cooperative security and collective security. According
to the definition given by Williams and Davis, "cooperation includes events ranging from
meetings of officials and verbal statements of support, to military and economic
agreements, establishing joint military commands, and jointly fighting a war. Cooperation
is neither the absence nor the opposite of conflict but a separate indicator that measures a
different type of state behavior. Both of these components are also incorporated in the
broader measure of net interactions, which represents the overall flow of relations from a
state to its dyadic partner." (Davis and Williams in Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 95).
Fred Chernoff states that "regimes promote cooperation by reducing the dangers and costs
of cooperating with others." (Chernoff, 1995, p. 15). Referring to the theory of Robert
Keohane, Chernoff concludes, "cooperation may continue in an established regime as
long as there is a community of interests, but not necessarily a coincidence of interests
among the states." (Chernoff, 1995, p. 15). 3
Clive Archer distinguishes three ways of developing multinational security
cooperation:
3 The original source of Chernoffs citation is Robert O. Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation
and Discord in the World Economy. Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
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• Collective defense. Organizations providing a collective defense have
as their main aim the defense of members against an identified enemy
or threat. Thus planning can be undertaken between the members on
how such a threat might be met by a collective response, with at least
part of the emphasis being placed on a joint military effort. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides the best example of a
collective defense organization, certainly from 1949 to 1989.
• Collective security. Organizations devoted to collective security bring
all members of the international community together in response to
aggression from any quarter. Thus the potential threat is unnamed, but,
should it materialize, all members of the organization should be
prepared to take collective action against the aggressor, regardless of
any alliance links they may have with that aggressor. The United
Nations, acting under Chapter Seven of the Charter, is a classic
example of a collective security organization.
• Cooperative security. This type of security arrangement represents an
attempt to maintain security by consensus. Here the emphasis is less on
identifying an aggressor (as with the above two systems) and more on
identifying problems that can lead to conflict and then attempting to
resolve them collectively. So the emphasis may be on peacekeeping
missions (as with the UN in Cyprus) or with conflict prevention and
avoidance (as with the OSCE). (Archer in Brundtland and Snider,
1994, 120)
This three-dimensional division refers objectively to the period of the Cold War.
Alliances of the "balance of power era" often represented collective defense institutions.
"The distinction between collective defense and collective security is often blurred. Many
persons apply the term collective security to any alliance, particularly one they approve
of including NATO. This conceptual confusion is regrettable because collective security
was originally conceived as an alternative to alliances for collective defense." (Yost,
1998, p. 137). The post-Cold War era recognizes two types of security arrangements:
collective defense (institutional security - NATO, the WEU); and cooperative security
(outside of alliances - PfP, Mediterranean Initiatives by NATO and the WEU, Nordic-
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Baltic security cooperation, and so forth). Cooperative security offers the most relevant
options to decrease the magnitude of the Baltic security dilemma today, because the
security policy preferences of the states in the region differ a lot significantly.
Collective and cooperative security arrangements seem promising because mutual
interdependence - political, economic, and even cultural - has grown to a great extent.
The emergence of collective and cooperative security arrangements has also increased
interdependence in the fields of security and defense.
Military force is not used by governments toward other governments
within the region, or the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It
may, however, be important in these governments' relations with
governments outside that region, or other issues. Military force could, for
instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues
among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for
that alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc. For the
former relationships this condition of complex interdependence would be
met; for the latter, it would not. (Keohane and Nye in Williams et al.,
1994, p. 77)
Political and economic interdependence usually can create security
interdependence. "In this cooperative security perspective, the security of one state is
viewed as intrinsically linked to, and dependent on, the security of others. This
interdependence of security thus motivates states to utilize multilateral forums, including
formal institutions, to make cooperation easier." (Kay, 1998, p. 9). Thus, the European
Economic Community established a basis for the European Union, and the character of
this organization created immediate needs for what we know today as the European
Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The further logical development
of the CFSP is the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Similar security needs
15
which will be examined in this work, have promoted security and defense cooperation in
the Baltic Sea region.
C. REGIONALIZATION
Enhancing regional security cooperation is one way to escape from security
dilemmas. In its traditional meaning regionalization refers to regional cooperation and
mutual interdependence between cooperation partners. The modern trend towards
regionalization has been treated in different ways. Kenichi Ohmae proposed a formula of
region-state as a model for future states, predicted the disappearance of national
differences and the rise of new identities based on economic relationships.4 The modern
tendency illustrates that cooperation tends to be multinational and is institutionalized into
different organizations. The European Union (EU), the North-Atlantic Free Trade Area
(NAFTA), the cooperation in the Caribbean area, which is institutionalized into the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and many other examples could describe this
process perfectly.
The early 1990s heard much talk of regionalism and the regionalization of
world politics. Regional conflicts replaced the global conflict on the
world's security agenda. Major powers, such as Russia, China, and the
United States, as well as secondary powers, such as Sweden and Turkey,
redefined their security interests in explicitly regional terms. Trade within
regions expanded faster than trade between regions, and many foresaw the
emergence of regional economic blocs, European, North American, East
Asian, and perhaps others. The term "regionalism," however, does not
adequately describe what was happening. Regions are geographical not
political or cultural entities. As with the Balkans or the Middle East, they
4 The idea of region-state was presented in Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region
Stale,"Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 No.2, (Spring 1997): 78-87.
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may be riven by inter- and intracivilization conflicts. Regions are a basis
for cooperation among states only to the extent that geography coincides
with culture. (Huntington, 1997, p. 130)
After World War II, the strengthening of the European common identity started to
replace the traditional competition between the European powers. These plans have been
realized by the appearance of a new political and economic cooperation formula on the
European political landscape - the European Union. In addition to political and economic
unification of Europe, there is yet another process under way called regionalization.
Regionalization is a process whereby similar social and political interests are
institutionalized in a particular region, and it consists of political, security, defense,
economic, cultural, ethnic dimensions. It may also include historical, cultural factors and
geopolitical factors. Regionalization may exist within the framework of larger
organizations (such as NATO and EU) or be institutionalized into separate organizations.
Joenniemi and Waever treat the meaning of regions and regionalization as
follows:
• Regions are defined by shared traits of a topographical or cultural
nature, i.e. internal similarity distinguishing the region from
neighboring and allegedly different areas.
• Regions are defined by great power rivalry in the international system,
which tends to generate regional arenas as a product of great power
politics and local reactions.
Regions come into being as a result of revolutionary changes in
technology, particular transport and communication. New economic
and social networks come into being, providing the breeding ground
for what might be called neo-regionalism, defying the centralizing
tendencies inherent in older technologies, and thereby favoring new
elites. These regions can be mapped and localized by studying the
actual patterns of interaction and processes.
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• Regions are constituted by political projects where often stories are
told along the lines of region-logic- 1 or -2 (about similarity, shared
history, geography - or external threats and pressures) - and produce
something like region-3-networks - but the emphasis in this fourth
approach is on the way these "facts" are selected and arranged as part
of a political and discursive rearranging of geographical space.
(Joenniemi and Waever in Wellmann, 1992, p. 15)
The importance of regional security has increased in different parts of the world.
New initiatives, like the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue or WEU's Mediterranean
Initiative, have involved different subregions and they are moved away from the
framework of institutions. Regionalization offers not only solutions for mitigating
security dilemmas but a way to organize cooperation between countries with similar
security concerns. Technological changes in the current century led to a situation where
military capability has acquired new meanings and a global military power has spread all
over the world. "All those developments make regionalization the central trend in military
strategy and power in the post-Cold War world. Regionalization provides the rationale for
the reductions in Russian and Western military forces and for increases in the military
forces of other states. Russia no longer has a global capability but is focusing its strategy
and forces on near abroad." (Huntington, 1997, p. 90).
These developments have caused wishes to promote regional security by creating
regional security institutions. The concept of regional security complexes5 "is about
distinctive patterns of security relations within regions." (Buzan and Waever in 0berg,
5 The concept of security complexes is presented Barry Buzan' s book People, States, and Fear:
An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (original 1983), Harvester
Wheatsheaf, London 1991. Before that it was introduced in Barry Buzan's and Gowher Rizvi's South Asian
Insecurity and the Great Powers, Macmillan, London 1986.
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1992, p. 87). The concept developed by British scholar Barry Buzan stresses security
interaction among the neighbor-states and importance of geographical proximity in the
security relations. The Baltic Sea region has all the features of those security complexes.
It has a multidimensional character, including the NATO members and aspirants,
countries following non-alignment policy (Sweden, Finland), and Russia, which
represents a separate dimension by itself. 6
Regions can stimulate cooperation, but sources of regional conflicts still seem be
inexhaustible. Frequently, those conflicts have initiated long and bloody wars with
involvement of powers outside of the region. In the modern era of globalization, it is
difficult to solve the regional conflicts within a limited security complex because of
enhanced mutual interdependence in the contemporary world. "Crisis management on the
global level would also necessitate, in fact, termination of the regional war if and when
this war reaches the point where it could escalate to involve the military forces of one or
more of the great powers." (Miller, 1995, p. 61).
6 The idea of security communities, particularly using Nordics as an example, was discussed by




III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION -
GENERAL OVERVIEW
A. HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS
Nations around the Baltic Sea have a lot of common historical and cultural
features to share. The Swedes, Danish, Russians, Polish or Germans dominated the region
entirely or partially. At the same time, there is a strong interlinkage and mutual
dependence between countries and provinces of the region. The Baltic Sea region
includes several different political and cultural dimensions. First, Scandinavian countries,
with their special historical identity, form the core of the region. Scandinavian nations
have always remained active participants in the regional matters, depending on their
geographical location, even if the interest of other nations towards the Baltic Sea has been
varied. Second, Germany and different German states, reached to the Baltic Sea in the
early Middle Ages. Germany has traditionally been a great regional power in the Baltic
Sea region and influenced the history of all the Baltic Sea countries. Nevertheless,
Germany's national interests in the region after World War II have remained outside of
her primary political goals. Poland and Lithuania became powers on the Baltic Sea since
14* -16* century but they have also been more connected with the Central-European
countries. Estonia and Latvia (to some extent also Finland) have been a long-time
battlefields between East and West. In this respect, German and Scandinavian countries
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competed with another power, Russia, which has definitely been an essential influence in
several developments in the Baltic Sea region.
Samuel Huntington noted that the ideological conflict between nations that
determined the world order from the middle of 20,h century has recently been replaced by
the increasing influence of the cultural/civilizational differences. "A central axis of post-
Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture with the
power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western civilizations." (Huntington
1997, p. 29). According to Huntington's theory, there is a civilizational conflicxt in the
Baltic Sea region. Except Russia that is a core state of the Orthodox civilization,
countries of the region belong to the Western civilization. It gives a considerable
probability to the future conflict between Russia and the countries within the domain of
Western civilization.
Considering the close links between nations around the Baltic Sea, we can discern
and discuss a special cultural identity - the Baltic subcivilization, the roots of which
originated from the medieval Hanseatic League. The Hanseatic League was the most
powerful economic player in the Baltic Sea region between 12 th -17 th century and it
determined to a great extent the prosperity of trade and banking in the northern part of
Europe. Additionally, it was able to mobilize considerable military power to defend its
interests, if necessary. The Hanseatic League consisted of about 200 towns from Holland
to Estonia including also some Russian towns like Novgorod, and its center was situated
in the northern German town Lubeck.
The core states of the Baltic subcivilization are Sweden, Germany, and to a lesser
degree Denmark. Religiously, the subcivilization is mostly Protestant (Lutheran). The
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reformation movement, initiated by Martin Luther in the 16th century, met its greatest
success in Northern Europe. At the same time, the border between subcivilizations does
not go along the borders of countries. Germany is actually multicultural nation, which
consists of regions with different political and cultural history. While Schleswig-Holstein
is a natural part of the Baltic Sea region, it is more difficult to find common interests, for
example, between Baden-Wurttemberg or Bavaria on the one hand, and the Baltic Sea
countries on the other hand. Three nations, Russia, Lithuania, and Poland, belong
politically to the Baltic Sea region but they have only a few common characteristics with
the Baltic subcivilization. Catholic Poland and Lithuania are rather the bridges to the
Central-European subcivilization, and Russia is the core nation of another big
civilization, the Orthodox world.
The history of the Baltic Sea region witnessed two forms of interlinkage between
countries - cooperation and conflict. The primacy of either of those actions has been
varied through centuries. The Baltic Sea region has been a historical battlefield between
several regional powers. "The history of the region, after this early settlement is
intimately bound up with the permanent struggles for supremacy in the whole Baltic
region between a succession of rising and falling powers: the Teutonic Knights, the
Danes, the Hanseatic towns, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Prussia, Russia and the Soviet
Union. At all events, the region was, for the most part a victim, an object rather than a
subject of its own history." (Fitzmaurice, 1992, p. 4). Throughout history, we see
different developments in interstate relations here. Wars varied with peaceful cooperation
between the Baltic Sea nations. Marju Lauristin provides us a table, which indicates the
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mutual interdependence between the nations of the Baltic Sea region. (Lauristin in
Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 33).
Table 4. Factors of Integration and Separation in the Baltic Sea Region 7
Factors of integration Factors of separation
1. Belonging to the same state is a widespread
experience in the region: Finns and Estonians with
Swedes, Danes and Russians; Latvians, Lithuanians,
and Poles with Russians; Lithuanians with Poles;
Estonians and Latvians with Germans; Swedes,
Danes and Poles with Germans; Norwegians with
Danes and Swedes; Icelanders with Danes and
Norwegians.
1. Wars, occupations, military confrontations
(between Russia and Germany, Russia and Finland,
Poland and Germany, Denmark and Germany,
Sweden and Russia, Poland and Russia, Sweden and
Denmark, etc.
2. Belonging to a common linguistic group
facilitates integration between Estonians and Finns,
Germans and Scandinavians, Latvians and
Lithuanians, Poles and Russians.
2. Overlapping ethnic and class borders (e.g.,
Swedish aristocracy in Finland, Baltic German
aristocracy in Estonia and Latvia, Polish aristocracy
in Lithuania).
3. Similar religious traditions unite nations with a
Protestant background (Germans, Scandinavians,
Finns, Estonians, Latvians) and with a Catholic
background (Lithuanians, Poles).
3. Religious differences between Western and
Eastern Christian traditions.
4. The Hanseatic League was an important
economic union for the integration of the Western
and Eastern parts of the Baltic region.
4. Different rates of economic and technological
development.
5. The existence of historical minority communities
on other's territories, mutual migration (Finns and
Estonians in Sweden; Poles in Lithuania and vice
versa; Baltic Germans in Estonia and Latvia;
Swedes in Finland and Estonia, etc.).
5. Differences in living standards and life-styles.
6. Similar cultural forms, common traditions. 6. Different political regimes and ideologies.
7 The table was originally presented by Marju Lauristin in the book edited by her and Peeter
Vihalemm Return to the Western World. Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997. Table 4 is an augmented
variant of her contribution.
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There was a sole regional war on the Baltic Sea in the current century - the
Finnish Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939/40. The other military
conflicts have been part of the global conflicts (World War I, World War II, and the
Russian Civil War). As the Finnish Winter War can be treated as a prelude to World War
II, the last "real regional war" was between Germany and Denmark about the Schleswig-
Holstein area in 1863-64. Thus, we can conclude that the Baltic Sea region has
traditionally been considered as a low intensity conflict area since the mid- 19th century.
At the same time, belonging to opposite alliances, membership in different institutions
and differences in foreign policy preferences made regional cooperation more
complicated than the state interests could actually afford.
During the Cold War, the security conditions in the Baltic Sea region were
influenced by bipolar opposition between the two antagonistic competitive systems.
NATO countries in the region (Denmark, West-Germany, Iceland, Norway) have been
balanced by the Soviet Union, and its allies from the Warsaw Treaty Organization -
Poland and East-Germany. The Swedes, despite their traditional neutrality and being
dominated many years by leftist Social Democrats, trained her armed forces to be
interoperable with NATO in a relative sense and developed military cooperation with the
United States. Finland, politically a Western democracy, had its foreign and security
policy strongly conditioned by the reality, that the Soviet Union was on its long frontier,
and they were under the pressure of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and the 1948 Treaty of
Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. (Brundtland in
Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p. 4).
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After the Cold War, the conflictual basis in relationship has been replaced with
the regional cooperation, which makes possible to turn to the era of New Hansa. The
medieval Hanseatic League offers considerable sources for regional cooperation, which
could be a model for the present. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was
established in March 1992 on a German-Danish initiative. This organization, which has
been founded in the spirit of the Hansa cooperation, includes 12 member-states:
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden,
and the European Commission. It is important to mention the individual membership of
the European Commission that establishes the close relationship between the CBSS and
the EU. The CBSS has no permanent secretariat or its own budget in this organization,
and the routine business is performed by the presiding country. Three working groups
were established in the framework of the CBSS: Working Group on Economic
Cooperation, Working Group on Assistance to Democratic Institutions, and Working
Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety. In its first stage, the CBSS excluded issues,
which would be connected with the security policy, and was mainly concentrated into
economic, cultural, and environmental cooperation. From the governmental meeting held
in Visby (Sweden) in the beginning of May 1996, there was raised a need to switch some
'soft-security cooperation issues' into the framework of CBSS. These measures include
some cooperation in humanitarian operations like search and rescue.
The security measures of the extended Baltic Sea region have traditionally had a
low profile. Norway and Denmark are members of NATO but they practice some special
restrictions in their defense policy since the Cold War. They do not allow the stationing
of foreign military troops and nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime. The
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modern era opened a door for enhanced security and defense cooperation on the Baltic
Sea, which includes not only institutional but also bilateral and multilateral cooperative
security arrangements. Regional security and defense cooperation has several pillars, the
most known is the Nordic and the Nordic-Baltic security and defense cooperation. The
Nordic security community is unique which "is merely based on a pattern of cooperation
that is institutionally restricted to low politics with an ideology that is so vague that it
might rather be referred as a common sentiment." (Wiberg and Waever in 0berg, 1992,
p. 18). On the southern flank of the Baltic Sea, the extended trilateral cooperation
between Denmark, Germany and Poland is evolving. Extensive bilateral defense relations
are established between Poland and Lithuania, and between Estonia and Finland. Since
1993, there has been a remarkable number of the Estonian officer corps which has been
educated in Finland, and Finland has offered a three-year program to re-establish the
structure of the Estonian Defense Forces.
There are positive examples arising on the Baltic Sea, which could give their
positive impulse to the regional cooperation. First of all, the traditional peaceful
cooperation between Nordic countries contributes to the regional peace. The return of
democratic Germany to Northern Europe and positive shifts in bilateral cooperation, as
between Lithuania and Poland, have enhanced stability in the region. The post-Cold War
security dilemmas are still connected with historical desires of Russia to increase her
influence in the Baltic Sea countries. Struggles for sphere of influence are strongly
presented on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, in the Baltic Sea and Kaliningrad. Russia
also attempts to maintain a considerable military presence in Northern Europe.
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B. NORDIC COOPERATION
Nordic or Scandinavian countries have a strong cultural and historical identity,
which has its specific political dimension. The Nordic cooperation was institutionalized
into the Nordic Council in 1952, including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, and
Finland joined the club four years later. There were many functioning cooperation
elements between the Nordic countries before this, however, the Union of Kalmar
between 1397-1521 joined all Nordic countries together into one state and created
historical bases for further cooperation. Scandinavian history includes regular ministerial
meetings between the period 1918-1939, Danish-Norwegian-Swedish currency union in
1873-1914, Nordic postal union since 1860, and Nordic interparliamentary union since
1907. Of course, this is just a part of integration the Scandinavian countries have
established throughout this century8 . The security and defense policies of the Nordic
countries have had a defensive character since Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the
19
th
century, when Sweden was ultimately a partner in a greater European coalition. The
last imperialistic war the Nordic countries were involved in, as participants not victims,
was probably the Great Northern War between 1700-1721.
The security policy pattern that emerged in the Nordic region after the
war reflected the proximity of the great power. Those states which were
furthest away from the Soviet Union (Norway and Denmark) became
members of NATO; Sweden proclaimed its non-aligned status but
oriented itself entirely towards the West; and Finland, restricted in its
foreign policy by the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance with the Soviet Union from 1948, tried to uphold an
independent neutrality policy.(Jonsson in Baranovsky, pp. 305-306)
8 Scandinavian countries fought each other over the centuries. In 1905 Norway and Sweden almost
th
went to war. Their cooperation is confined to the 20 century (Comment of Professor Rodney Minott, 30
November 1998).
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The Nordic security and defense cooperation never turned into a reality until the
Cold War ended. Neutrality was a traditional form of the Nordic security policy in the
first half of the 20lh century. Nordic countries were not involved in World War I, and they
tried to keep neutrality during World War II. Nevertheless, Germany occupied Norway
and Denmark and they lost temporarily their sovereignty. For that reason, there was no
interest in Denmark and Norway to continue neutrality in security policy matters. There
were discussions about the formation of the Scandinavian Defense Union after World
War II. "Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had hoped to create a regional collective
security institution of their own based on shared cultural identity, commonality of
interests, and at Sweden's insistence, neutrality." (Kay, 1998, p. 28). Different opinions
concerning the neutrality made these attempts unsuccessful.
After the idea of an independent Scandinavian Defense Union failed in the late
1940s, Norway and Denmark joined NATO, and Finland signed the Treaty of Friendship
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. The emerging Nordic security
dilemma was based on the concept of the Nordic Balance, which was elaborated by
Norwegian political scientists Nils 0rvik, Arne Olav Brundtland, and Johan J. Hoist.
This concept followed the realist tradition of International Relations theory, with the aim
to find a place for Northern Europe in the Cold War's bipolar system. The concept of the
Nordic balance is based on the argument that there is a bipolar security situation and
spheres of influence among the Nordic countries (see Table 5). The Nordic Balance
meant that "if the Soviet Union increased its pressure on Finland, the Nordic NATO
members might ease their present bans on foreign bases and nuclear weapons in
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peacetime, thus making for a greater US/NATO military presence; the knowledge of this
could dissuade the Soviet Union. On the other hand, such an increasing presence might
lead to a Soviet call for closer cooperation with Finland." (Wiberg and Waever in 0berg,
1992, p. 25).
Table 5. The Nordic Balance 1949-1991
NATO's sphere of
influence
Neutral The WPO's sphere of
influence
Norway, Denmark Sweden Finland
The Nordic balance was one of the classical results of the security dilemma.
Today, after the collapse of the Cold War's bipolarity, and the initial unification process
in the European continent, we might say that the Nordic balance is history. Nordic
countries have been rather successful in establishing political and economic cooperation
with each other, but the security and defense cooperation made progress only during the
last years. The end of the Cold War abolished institutional barriers that excluded Nordic
military cooperation during the forty-five years, and the new initiatives like PfP made this
cooperation even more flexible. "In fact Nordic cooperation in the defense field has
increased since 1989. The regular meetings of defense ministers that earlier had only UN
peacekeeping operations on the agenda now touch upon every aspect of security.
Cooperation in creation of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion is one example. The
development of the Nordic battalions in the former Yugoslavia into the Nordic Brigade in
IFOR is the most spectacular example and it may become a permanent institution in
Nordic security. A treaty on cooperation in procurement was signed in December 1994."
(Dorfer, 1997, p. 71). In 1997, the joint Nordic military exercise "in the spirit of PfP"
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"Nordic Peace 97" took place in Norway, followed by "Nordic Peace 98" in Sweden with
the participation of the Baltic countries. Now, the Nordic defense cooperation has
involved to a great extent the Baltic states, and we can talk about the joint Nordic-Baltic
security complex, which, mainly by the initiatives of Denmark, may enlarge to include
Germany and Poland in the near future.
The security situation of Denmark improved a lot in the last decade. Denmark has
an extensive experience as the NATO outpost in the frontier of the Warsaw Pact
countries. This would be one reason why Denmark especially is vitally interested in the
enlargement of NATO to the Baltic Sea, and has been an initiator of different bilateral
and institutional cooperative security and defense cooperation activities in the Baltic Rim.
Additionally to the traditional cooperation with Germany and Nordic partners Denmark
has set apart remarkable resources for establishing a defense cooperation with Poland and
Baltic states and Denmark has often been the main supporter in their integration to the
European structures.
Norway and Iceland have traditionally been more oriented to the transatlantic
relationship rather than identifying themselves as purely European nations. Norway has
twice rejected the EU membership and Iceland never applied to the EU. Today, Norway
has remained the only member of NATO, which has a land border with Russia. The
Russian threat did not disappear from Norway with the end of the Cold War. "Unlike in
Denmark, in Norway the Russian threat remained unchanged after 1990, even as Russia's
Northern Fleet rusted at the piers and gradually lost its offensive capability." (Dorfer,
1997, p. 36). Therefore, Norway is vitally interested in maintaining "the NATO flag" in
the Norwegian territory.
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Sweden and Finland have survived general changes in their security policy in
1990s. They have practically given up their Cold War traditional neutrality, and
introduced new solutions in security policy. The non-alignment policy practiced by
Sweden and Finland means that they develop cooperation with the European and
Transatlantic security and defense organizations but do not seek membership. Both,
Sweden and Finland, have enhanced their participation in PfP cooperation, and have
actively participated in different Baltic assistance programs.
The Nordic model of cooperative security can be extended to other parts of the
region and developed into the security community of the Baltic Sea states. "The notion
that states in a region do not go to war with each other and that there is no expectation
that such conflict will happen is a core element of Karl Deutsch's notion of a security
community. One in which the states are not politically integrated." (Archer, 1996, p. 452).
There was little hope to realize the idea of a security community under the circumstances
of the Cold War. However, a changing security environment and the progress of
democratization of the Baltic Sea creates preconditions for that circumstance.
C. GERMANY - A REGIONAL GREAT POWER?
The Baltic Sea region has been outside of Germany's primary foreign and security
policy goals for a long time. "With the reunification of Germany in 1990, a littoral state
disappeared from the Baltic map and a former Great Baltic power re-emerged." (Krohn,
1994, p. 594). It is predictable that the German interests in the region will increase after
her governmental institutions will finally move to Berlin. "The move of the capital from
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Bonn to Berlin will strengthen northern Germany as it will Northern Europe; the Eastern
Baltic coast of Germany will again flourish, since the neighborhood of the most important
city in Europe cannot remain a backwater." (Dorfer, 1997, p. 46).
There are some fears, mainly historical, about the strengthening of Germany.
These fears are related especially with its military power, and there are attempts to see the
strenghtening of Germany in connection with Germany's possible aggressive influence
against her smaller neighbors. Nevertheless, these perceptions seem to be rather unlikely.
The strengthening of democratic Germany could have also positive consequences, for
example, balancing Russian power in the region. "Today there is no threat to Germany.
For this reason and because of economic commitments in the East, Bonn is unlikely to
invest very much in military forces." (Lodgaard in 0berg, 1992, p. 289).
Germany's particular interests in the region, including trade, fishing,
transportation, and environmental protection, do not differ much from other Baltic Sea
countries. It is remarkable that with the exception of Estonia, Germany is among the first
three trade partners of all the Baltic Sea countries (see Table 2), and her economic
interests are growing. "The Kiel Canal has the highest amount of ship traffic in the
world." (Krohn, 1994, p. 595). It is in Germany's interest to promote trade and
cooperation in the Baltic Rim. The towns of Northern Germany initiated the Hanseatic
League, and the economic and cultural influence of Germany in the Baltic Sea countries
has been traditionally noteworthy.
The relationship between Germany and the new democracies in the region, Poland
and the Baltic countries, is developing rapidly. Germany is perhaps the strongest
supporter of Poland in its integration with the European institutions. The possible conflict
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area concerning the border between Germany and Poland was regulated with the border
treaty of 1990. The reasons why Germany's special interests in the EU and NATO
enlargement are related with Poland proceed not only from historical guilt about the
Polish sufferings during World War II, but also from Germany's security concerns in
avoiding its status as a 'border-state' between Europe and the Russian sphere of influence
and to establish a politically and economically stable neighborhood. "It would not be the
old Mitteleuropa of German imperialism but a more benign community of economic
renewal stimulated by German investments and trade, with Germany also acting as the
sponsor of the eventually formal inclusion of the new Mitteleuropa in both the European
Union and NATO." (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 69).
Germany's policy towards the Baltic States has been more complicated.
Generally, it includes three pillars: Germany is interested that these countries will remain
outside of the sphere of influence of Russia; Germany offers assistance in developing a
market economy and establishing an administrative and legal system, which is based on
democratic principles; Germany supports their aspirations in accession to the European
political institutions, primarily the European Union. We are also witnesses to the
increasing security and defense cooperation between Germany and the Baltic states,
though Germany has been a rare initiator on those matters.
At the end of 1980s, the former Premier of Schleswig-Holstein, Bjorn Engholm
(later leader of the German Social Democratic Party), initiated the idea of a new
Hanseatic cooperation, which was initially oriented to increase linkage between
Schleswig-Holstein and Scandinavian countries, at this time also dominated by Social
Democrats, "in order to bring Schleswig-Holstein out of a certain apparent isolation as a
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peripheral region in Germany on the way to nowhere." (Fitzmaurice, 1992, p. 151). The
key elements of new cooperation initiative were connected with several environmental
issues, but also transport, trade, energy policy, cultural links, and scientific research
cooperation. The changes in the political environment, emergence of new political actors
like the Baltic states or Poland, gave this initiative a broader prospect. This initiative was
finally institutionalized into the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was founded in
1992.
All in all, the reunification of Germany, and restoring the rights of Berlin as a
historical capital of Germany brought Germany back to the Baltic Sea. "After unification,
Germany inherited a long stretch of Baltic coast line. Before, Germany was basically
involved as a doorkeeper to the Danish Straits. As a result of German unification, NATO
also acquired a larger presence in the Baltic Sea region, without mentioning NATO's
potential incorporation of countries like Poland, the Baltic Republics, or even Sweden
and Finland." (Krohn, 1995, p. 598). We have historical evidence that a strong and
influential Germany has been an aggressive and destabilizing power in the region. Today,
however, the positive involvement of democratic Germany with regional cooperation may
give an impulse play to the establishment of a stable security environment around the
Baltic Sea.
D. LITHUANIA AND POLAND - REBIRTH OF COMMON HISTORY
There is a significant difference between the Catholic southeastern part of the
Baltic Sea region, and the Lutheran majority of Baltic Sea countries. Historically,
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Lithuania and Poland are more linked to Central-Europe, and their presence on the Baltic
Sea has been varied from time-to-time.
Differently from the main part of Lithuania, the coastal Klaipeda (Memel) area of
Lithuania was related with Germany and the German cultural space. For centuries, it was
heavily Protestant (Lutheran) and with a significant number of German population.
Similarly, thr Polish coastal areas around Sczeczin (Stettin), Gdansk (Danzig), and
Gdynia (Gotenhafen) with contiguous territories were populated with Germans or
German-Polish mixed population. Stettin was a German town until the end of the World
War II.
The close relationship between Lithuania and Poland began from Middle Ages.
The Personal Union from 1386 lasted until the last division of Rzeczpospolita in 1795.
Between World War I and World War II, the relationship between Lithuania and Poland
was full of tensions. The main reason of the interstate conflict was that Poland annexed in
1920 the historical capital of Lithuania - Vilnius (Vilno), which belonged to Poland until
1939 when Poland was divided again between Germany and Soviet Union, and the Soviet
Union returned the Vilno area temporarily back to Lithuania, just before Lithuania itself
was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940.
There are several painful issues influencing the relationship between Lithuania
and Poland. The Vilnius (Vilno) question is one of them. This city is a part of history for
both countries. There is a strong Polish minority in Lithuania, mainly in the Vilnius area.
There is also a Lithuanian minority in the North-East of Poland. When Lithuania regained
her independence in the 1990s, the Polish minority in Lithuania did not support the
secession from the Soviet Union, fearing Lithuanian pressure on their identity.
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The bilateral relationship between the two countries, however, developed with a
remarkable success in the post-Cold War era. "The most important aspect of changes in
Lithuanian foreign policy at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 concerned the
hierarchy of partners. The efficiency of cooperation with the Baltic states was questioned,
and the development of relationship with Poland was indicated as being of primary
importance." (Zajaczkowski in Wohlfeld, 1997, p. 15).
Poland has been very active in seeking membership in the European and
Transatlantic security and defense organizations. "As Poland's former Foreign Minister
Andrzej Olechowski stated, the first reason is Poland's attempt to hedge against a
potentially expansionistic Russian policy, which in substance implies a US nuclear
security guaranty. The second reason is the hope that quick NATO membership is
probably an important stepping stone toward a safe entrance into the EU. The third reason
might be the attempt to 'counterbalance' the strong German position in NATO, that is
avoiding a strong sphere of German influence in the Central- and Eastern-European
countries." (Krohn, 1994, p. 596). Many Lithuanian politicians have seen the cooperation
with Poland as a direct access to the European and Transatlantic structures. The
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas has mentioned that "Lithuania's strategic
partnership with Latvia and Estonia was agreed long ago, however such cooperation may
sometimes not seem beneficial." (Zajaczkowski in Wohlfeld, 1997, p. 15).9
Similar to Estonian-Finnish cooperation, the defense cooperation between
Lithuania and Poland has made quick progress. "From 1993 to 1996, several decisions
were made resulting in the establishment of a Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion, a
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common airspace system, and the organization of joint military exercises." (Zajaczkowski
in Wohlfeld, 1997, p. 15). There is an obvious tendency to strengthen the relationship
between the two neighbors, which have similar security concerns. "An alternative to the
Baltic option for Lithuania has been the close cooperation with the Central and Eastern
European region, especially with Poland, who is a strategic partner of Lithuania." (Rull,
1998, p. 5). The enhanced Polish-Lithuanian cooperation does not necessarily mean the
end of Baltic cooperation. However, these two nations have shared a common history,
and their further interlinkage is generally positive and that should be understood and
encouraged by other countries.
9 Minister Saudargas presented his views to the press after his visit to Warsaw in January 1997.
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IV. POST-COLD WAR SECURITY DILEMMAS ON THE BALTIC
SEA
A. THE BALTIC QUESTION - THE ETERNAL SECURITY DILEMMA?
Three small countries on the eastern cost of the Baltic Sea have been battlefield
for their powerful neighbors for a long time. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have
experienced similar fates during the last century. This has often led to the mistaken belief
that their historical and cultural backgrounds are close to each other. In fact, the Baltic
states may be described as a geopolitical unity. This does not exclude historical and
cultural differences between these countries. The Estonian language is close to the
Finnish language and differs a great deal from the Latvian and Lithuanian languages,
which are close to each other. Since the 13* century, Estonians and Latvians have been
under German and Scandinavian cultural influence. A majority of Estonians and people
in the Northern and Western Latvia are Lutheran Protestants like people in Scandinavia
and Northern Germany.
The Lithuanians established an independent statehood relatively at the same time.
Later they joined into a personal union with Poland. Religiously, they are Roman
Catholics as their Polish neighbors (similarly to the Latvians in the Eastern Latvia).
Russia established her power over Estonia and Northern Latvia during the Great Northern
War between 1700-1710. The rest of Latvia and Lithuania came under the Russian
Empire with the division of Poland at the end of 1
8
lh
century. There was a fundamental
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difference in the destiny of Baltic nations within the Russian Empire. While "German" or
Lutheran provinces (Estland, Lifland and Kurland) maintained their cultural origin and
close relationship with German states and the Russian central power did not interfere in
their domestic matters until the end of the 19th century, Lithuania and Poland had to
suffer under strong Russian pressure.
The Baltic cooperation has been a "hot topic" since the world recognized the
Baltic states as an independent geopolitical region, after World War I. Initially, the
Baltics included all the former non-Russian parts of the former Russian empire in the
region, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland. There were attempts to
create a regional Baltic organization between World War I and World War II, but these
attempts failed because of several conflicts and different attitudes of the possible
members. Finland tried to establish close links with Scandinavian countries, which, in
their turn, were not interested in small and weak Baltic countries as possible areas. Poland
aspired to the leader role of the smaller Baltic Union, but its aspirations were destined to
failure due to the border conflict with Lithuania over the Vilno (Vilnius) area. In 1934,
when Poland concluded a friendship agreement with Germany and withdrew from the
Baltic cooperation, the agreement between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was finally
signed. "The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed by the three Baltic states for
an initial ten-year period, called for periodic conferences of their foreign ministers and
consultation on foreign policy matters of mutual interest. However, the most significant
point about the Baltic entente is that it did not include a military alliance, and even the
earlier Estonian-Latvian pact in July 1921, which theoretically established military
cooperation, did not lead to common defense plans." (Raun, 1987, p. 125).
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Low measures in cooperation and underestimation of military threat to their
independence led to a similar scenario for all the Baltic states, including Finland and
Poland. At the beginning of World War II all these countries were targets of aggression
from Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result of "the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" and
its enclosures, they initiated attacks against sovereignty of all Baltic countries and only
Finland was able to maintain her sovereignty after the war with the Soviet Union in
1939/1940 and again in the period 1941-1944. The destiny of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania remained similar and they re-established their statehood in 1991. The political
cooperation after the re-independence includes interparliamentary cooperation (the Baltic
Assembly), and regular governmental consultations (the Baltic Council). As result of
historical experiences, the military cooperation in the post-Cold War period has been very
successful. There have been discussions about the Baltic Defense Union again, but the
security needs of the Baltic countries demand a larger determination of the security
complex with the involvement of other countries. Thus, the Baltic military cooperation is
channalized into the international Baltic defense projects (BALTBAT, BALTNET,
BALTRON, BALTDEFCOL), the framework of European-Transatlantic cooperative
security arrangements (PfP, Nordic-Baltic), and regular contacts between leadership.
There is a natural desire of the Baltic countries to rejoin the European or Western
civilizations to which they have belonged since the 13th century or even before. One
option for that is the joining with the European and Transatlantic political, economic, and
security institutions like the European Union or NATO. These organizations cannot
substitute each other, but they both represent the Western civilization with its values and
beliefs. The attempts to create a "buffer zone" in the Baltic states between Russia and the
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West failed already between World War I and World War II. "There has been over the
years a Baltic dilemma for Russian policy in Northern Europe. The more force Russia
exerted to secure its interests in the Baltic area, the more vulnerable it became as a result
of reactions from the rest of the world. In today's world a withdrawn position from the
Baltic Sea and respect for Baltic independence seems to be a better guarantee of Russian
security in the Baltic area." (Jonsson in Baranovsky, 1997, p. 324). Russia, however,
tends to tolerate the accession of the Baltic states to EU and WEU, but is strongly against
joining these countries with NATO.
There were a lot of discussions about the proposal of the RAND corporation
analysts Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick to join the Baltic security guarantees with
Sweden and Finland. "Such steps should lead to a situation in which the Baltic states
approach the defense status currently enjoyed by countries like Sweden or Finland:
countries possessing modern militaries with a heavy emphasis on a national self-
sufficiency doctrine; but also countries that have very close relations with NATO and are
capable of being integrated into NATO at short notice, if and when that political decision
is taken." (Asmus and Nurick, 1995, p. 132). The Asmus-Nurick proposal is briefly
presented in five pillars, indicated by Sean Kay.
First, the three Baltic countries should institutionalize defense cooperation
among themselves. Second, involvement of the Nordic countries aiding
and assisting efforts by the Baltic countries to increase their security via a
wide range of cooperative programs should accelerate. The third pillar of
the strategy would be coordination of NATO and EU enlargement policies
so that "the EU flag would go up in Estonia at the same time that the
NATO flag goes up in Warsaw." Fourth, the process of NATO
enlargement should be clearly open-ended. Finally, further institutional
efforts should be made to modify Moscow's concerns over NATO
enlargement by including Russia in the emerging web of international
security cooperation wherever possible, and the West should look for ways
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to encourage constructive Russian-Baltic security interaction." (Kay, 1998,
p. 110)
We have to say that these five pillars are to a great extent realized through
practical cooperation, but they do not solve the Baltic security dilemma. The Baltic
security dilemma is a result of the following factors:
• The Baltic countries have always been a battlefield between two civilizations, that of
Western civilization and that of the Orthodox civilization. Germany, Russia, Sweden,
Denmark, and Poland have had in different periods their special interests here. The
historical desire of Russia from the 16th century has been to open a window to the
Baltic Sea. Germany, Sweden and Denmark have competed for this region since the
12
th
-13 th century, and few centuries later, Poland was added to the competition.
• During the period of 1945-1991, a remarkable numbers of Russians moved to the
Baltic countries. The amount of Russians from the total population is extended to
29% in Estonia, and 34% in Latvia. The proportion of Estonians and Latvians has
decreased correspondingly 65% and 52% of total population. Even if there are no
violent ethnic conflicts, Russian foreign policy has often tried to use the factor of
Russian minorities in achieving its political goals.
• The establishment of defense forces in the Baltic countries differs from similar
developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. Baltic countries had to start
from nothing, lacking necessary equipment, and educated officer corps, and without a
functioning defense structures and legal system.
Estonia has probably been the most successful Baltic country in promoting
economic welfare and democracy under the new circumstances. Mainly for that reason, in
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1997, the European Union invited Estonia together with five other nations to start
negotiations about the future joining with the EU. Latvia came under strong pressure
from Russia because of a relatively strict citizenship law that they had to change. The
geographical and political position of Latvia remained more isolated than that of their
northern and southern neighbors, which have close connections with Finland and Poland.
In considering additional factors such as unstable government, and the biggest proportion
of Russian minority among the Baltic states, Latvia is perhaps an easily vulnerable part in
the region.
The development of Lithuania has frequently differed from that of its northern
neighbors. Aside from a glorious past and the historical Polish influence, there are several
other factors, which led Lithuania to seek somewhat different paths to Europe. While
Estonia and Latvia practiced democracy until 1934, followed by mild authoritarian
regimes, Lithuania turned away from democracy in 1926, after the coup d'etat of the
future President Antanas Smetona. The further political development of Lithuania was
similar to other countries in Central-Europe at that time. After re-independence in 1991,
the development of Lithuania has differed from Latvia and Estonia. The smaller number
of Russian minority enabled Lithuania to accomplish a very liberal citizenship policy,
and, thus, to keep away from direct political attacks from the Russian side.
Historical and cultural differences could lead to different political approaches in
the future and we might assume that very close Baltic cooperation could be only
transitional. Estonia and Latvia should move closer and integrate with Nordic countries.




There are some historical paradoxes that make Russia's political behavior
unpredictable. Russia differs culturally from other neighbors on the Baltic Sea. It has
practically no democratic traditions and has survived many strong autocratic rulers.
Russia was definitely an European country between 1700-1917, when Russia was
largely involved with the European political games, and mostly identified itself as an
European power. After the communist coup in 1917, Russia (later the Soviet Union)
moved into isolation. Later, after the victorious World War n, the Soviet Union became
one of the dominant superpowers applying for the first time in its history to the global
leader role. Despite the fact that we witnessed the collapse of the last big colonial
empire, the Soviet Union, its successor-state Russia - despite its economic disaster - lost a
remarkable part of its military capability. Nevertheless, Russia still maintained a status of
a great military power. "Russia presents a security dilemma. It has sizeable armed forces,
including nuclear weapons. However, these forces are fragmented, poorly organized, and
may not be able to respond to political command." (Archer in Brundtland and Snider,
1994, p. 123). Russia tries to maintain her image as the global power, and contrast its
interests with the US interests as much it would be possible in the new security
environment.
The struggle between two Russian traditional political schools of thought, the
Westerners and the Slavophils, has been a natural part of the Russian history. As
Westerners are interested in enhancement of relations between Russia and Europe and
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they try to bring Russia closer to Europe, Slavophils emphasize the singularity of Russia,
the Russian Orthodox church, and the role of Russia as "a third Rome" which has a
global role in the world to carry out. In the first years of the Russian reindependence,
1991-1992, the Westerners, led by Premier Yegor Gaidar, dominated the Russian political
life. They believed "that the West (Western Europe and the United States) should be the
main orientation for Russian foreign policy. They insisted that Russia historically belongs
to the Western civilization. The main task for Russian international strategy should be
one of building a partnership with the West and joining Western economic, political, and
military organizations - the EU, NATO, IMF, World Bank, OECD, GATT, G-7."
(Sergounin, 1997, pp. 57-58). But economic chaos and transition difficulties led to the
weakening of their positions. Unfortunately, the West was not able to use the largely
positive interest in the European matters of Gaidar, and, at that time, was not able to
provide Russia with a particular "Marshall plan." The latter was obviously more
corresponding to the Russian needs than just elementary economic help.
Is Russia a threat to the other nations in the region? Referring to the past, the
Baltic Sea region has been a historic battlefield between Western Christianity
(Catholicism and Protestantism) and Eastern Christianity represented by Russian
Orthodoxy. The access to the Baltic Sea has been a remarkable part of the Russian foreign
policy since 16
th
century when the Russian Emperor Ivan IY ("Grozny") strengthened
pressure to the German states on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, and started the war of
conquest in 1558. "Over the centuries, Russia has sought to secure its access to the sea in
the West - to the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea. These interests were secured with the
help of traditional power politics. With a strong military and with recourse to military
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expedients, Russia achieved dominance and control." (Jonsson in Baranovsky, 1997, p.
305).
Russia (as the Soviet Union) had a strong political position in the Baltic Sea
countries in the years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union established political control not
only over the Baltic States, Poland, and Eastern Germany, but influenced Finland's policy
and was a major military power on the Baltic Sea. In the post-Cold War era, Russia lost
all her former allies and remained alone in the political arena. This failure caused
attempts to create some kind of instability in the region. "The Russian neighborhood
constitutes the main source of economic hopes as well as common security problems for
the future of the region. Nordic politicians have expressed continual concern about
Russia's politics in the region, especially stressing their support for the independence and
security of the Baltic countries. The former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt pointed
out, that the Baltic region provides the critical test of the relationship between Russia and
the West." (Lauristin in Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 35). 10
Russia's military presence in Northern Europe has been changed as a consequence
of several factors: (a) Russian military withdrawal from the independent Baltic States; (b)
international agreements on arms reduction; and (c) Russia's strained economy and
limited financial resources. (Jonsson in Baranovsky, 1997, p. 310). After the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia started to participate in several European and Baltic
cooperation activities. Russia became a member of the OSCE, the European Council, and
the Council of Baltic Sea States. At the same time, essential parts of the Baltic security
10 The original paper: Carl Bildt. "The Baltic Litmus Test," Foreign Affairs, Vol.73 No.5 (1994):
72-85.
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dilemma are directly connected with Russia's internal instability and her imperialist
foreign policy, which sometimes acquires aggressive tendencies. The Kaliningrad
question, relationship with the Baltic countries, arms control issues including reversions
concerning the CFE treaty and START II, and a general political and economic
instability, are among the primary threats against establishing a stable security
environment in the Baltic Sea region.
C. CFE TREATY AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION
The countries of the region are concerned with the developments of two major
arms control agreements in Europe, the START 11", which limits strategic nuclear
weapons, and the CFE Treaty 12 which deals with conventional weapons systems in
NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. Scandinavia has always aspired to be a
nuclear-free zone, and the Nordic countries do not allow deployment of nuclear forces in
their territory. Paradoxically, there is a high Russian nuclear concentration in the Nordic
area. The Kola complex in the neighborhood of Norway's and Finland's border may
house all the Russian nuclear submarines and 50 percent of the entire Russian nuclear
strategic force. (Dorfer, 1997, p. 7). The high Russian military concentration on the
1
' Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II.
' 2 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in 1990 by the members of
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to set ceilings for five categories of conventional military
equipment (tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft) for groups of
states as well as specific states in several zones in the "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" area." (Yost, 1998, p. 395).
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borders of the Nordic and Baltic countries makes understandable the latter' s concerns
about the future development of these treaties.
Russia has consistently demanded a revision of the limits set up in the original
CFE treaty, emphasizing the need to strengthen its forces in the troublesome southern
borders. "In arms control, the West has been faced with [Russia's]rigid demands for
revision of the CFE Treaty, even the readiness to violate its provisions unless 'flank
limits' are lifted or suspended." (Baev, 1996, p. 100). Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic
states did not become a part of the CFE treaty. However, the original treaty guaranteed
their security concerns to a great extent. The changes from June 1996 excluded the Pskov
area from the list of flank areas, which allows a considerable increase of Russia's military
capability near the frontiers of the Baltic states. Even if we take a priori that this revision
does not create an immediate military threat to the Baltic and Nordic countries, it is
difficult to find a reason for strengthening the Russian military presence in the Pskov
region either. Seeking historical parallels, we may refer to the remilitarization of the
Rhineland by Germany in 1936, which also established a stronghold for attacking
neighbors.
D. KALININGRAD (KONIGSBERG) AREA - A POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR
CONFLICT?
Serious security concerns on the Baltic Sea are connected with the Kaliningrad
(Konigsberg) area. The highly militarized Kaliningrad area has been a great security
problem from the end of World War n, when the former German East-Prussia was
divided between the Soviet Union and Poland. Since the 13 th century, the former East
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Prussia was historically a German territory and populated with the Germans until
1944/45. After World War II, it became one of the main Soviet military bases on the
Baltic Sea and a great majority of its population was related with the Soviet military
system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the attempts to establish a "free
economic zone" or "Baltic German Republic" under the Russian jurisdiction failed. "The
concentration of the Russian military in Kaliningrad is another matter of concern for
neighboring Poland and Lithuania. Baltiysk (50 km from Kaliningrad) is the main
Russian naval base for the Baltic Sea. From 60 000 to 400 000 military are stationed in
the Kaliningrad region. The Russian leadership still considers Kaliningrad as an
important military-strategic outpost of Russia in the Baltic Sea region and will keep the
Russian military presence at a significant level." (Sergounin in Baranovsky, 1997, p.
346). The data presented in Table 6 demonstrates Russia's military capability in the area,
taking into account also allowed CFE ceilings.
The Kaliningrad problem affects Russia's relationship with Lithuania, because the
shortest route from Russia to the enclave goes through Lithuania. "An informal
agreement between Russia and Lithuania with respect to the base was hammered out in
1991 in an exchange of diplomatic notes. Under the terms of the agreement, Russian
troops can travel across Lithuania by rail only, with a maximum of 180 soldiers on any
one train, their weapons in a separate car." (Coleman, 1997, p. 73). Despite the
agreement, there are two problems that influence the future of Russia-Lithuania
relationship concerning the Kaliningrad area. Kaliningrad has still remained Russia's
military outpost in the West. At the same time, Lithuania has clearly stated its intention to
join NATO in the near future. The Russia-Lithuania relationship will be very complicated
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in the future, if Russia continually identifies itself as the opposite power to NATO, and
treats the military pillar of CIS, the Tashkent Treaty, as a successor to the Warsaw Pact
Organization.
Table 6. The Russia's (Soviet Union's) Military Presence in the
Kaliningrad Area 1990-1995'J
1990 1995 CFE Ceilings
Manpower 60,000 40,000 1,450,000
Tanks 802 870 1,100
Armoured combat vehicles 1081 980 6,060
Artillery 677 410 735
Attack helicopters 48 52 3,450
Combat aircraft 155 42 890
The CFE treaty zone limitations created a very peculiar situation in the
Kaliningrad area, after the Russian troops left from the former Warsaw Pact countries and
the Baltic states. The CFE treaty allows Russia to concentrate all her armed resources,
which were allowed to station into the Eastern European countries with the original treaty
(including the Kaliningrad region and Baltic states), into the small Kaliningrad region.
Even if Russia does not plan on reaching the CFE ceilings, it is allowed to concentrate a
considerable military power outside its main territory.
13 Data is provided in Hansen, B. & Heurlin, B. The Baltic States in World Politics, 1998, 148.
Sources are originated from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-1996
and L.Vardomsky, L.Vorobyova, A.Yershov Kaliningradskaia oblast Rossiiskoi Federatsii: problemy I
perspektivy. Moscow: Raduga, 1995.
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Given that Russia is not a global power anymore and identifies itself as a
democratic state in the international community, there is no need to maintain Kaliningrad
as a military outpost. More appropriate solutions would be demilitarization of the
Kaliningrad area and the establishment of a "free economic zone." Pertti Joenniemi
presented an intresting approach that "recognized as inalienable part of Russia, the
[Kaliningrad] region could be invited, to become part of the European Economic Area,
therewith to outface the Federation as a whole." (Joenniemi, 1997, p. 32). This proposal
could be in accordance with Russia's interest in resolving its economic problems.
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V. BALTIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE (BALTSEA) - A FORMULA
OF REGIONAL COOPERATION
A. BACKGROUND
The appearance of new political actors in the Baltic Sea region, like Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, created a requirement to establish a special program to coordinate
Western assistance in rebuilding their own defense forces. For historical reasons, three
countries of the region, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who recently re-established their
independence and sovereignty, had to create their national defense from nothing. The
program called Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) includes all countries in the
region except Russia, but also countries outside the region - the United States, the United
Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Canada, joining together due to
their security concerns in the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. The idea relies on positive
consequences of earlier international support projects to the Baltic countries like
BALTBAT - Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion; BALTRON - Joint Baltic Naval Squadron;
BALTNET - Joint Baltic Air Surveillance System; BALTDEFCOL - Baltic Defense
College. Baltic Security Assistance is a remarkable instrument in avoiding negative
consequences of the security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region, and demonstrates the
willingness of partners to maintain a stable security environment in the region.
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B. BALTIC PROJECTS
The BALTBAT is the first, and probably the best known Baltic military
cooperation project. The idea was proposed in 1993 by the former Commander of the
Estonian Defense Forces, the U.S. -born General Aleksander Einseln. In 1994, three Baltic
countries and five Western partners (the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Denmark,
and Norway) concluded an agreement to establish a trilateral peacekeeping battalion. The
battalion consists of a combined trinational battalion staff, combined headquarters and a
logistics company and three national rifle companies. The battalion is formed from
volunteers of three Baltic countries.
Since 1995, the Baltic national military units participated in peacekeeping and
peace enforcement missions. They were in former Yugoslavia as a part of the Danish or
Swedish units, including UNIPROFOR-missions in Croatia and EFOR/SFOR-missions in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1996-1997, the Estonian Peacekeeping Company participated
in Norway's UNIFIL mission in Southern Lebanon. However, there are still problems in
finding a permanent mission for the BALTBAT.
The idea of BALTNET project was presented for the first time in 1994 when three
Baltic states started to coordinate their efforts to create a joint air surveillance radar
system. The Regional Airspace Initiative study, sponsored and conducted by the United
States, and extended to the Baltic states in 1996, has found a necessary output here. In
1997, the BALTNET project officially started under the chairmanship of Norway. The
main tasks of the project are the building a Regional Air Surveillance Coordination
Center and providing equipment and training.
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The idea of a common Baltic naval unit (BALTRON) was raised during the
Baltic-Danish staff talks in August 1996. The permanent Headquarters was established in
Talinn in April 1998. Estonia and Latvia provided the BALTRON project with two
minesweepers and one ship came from Lithuania.
The Baltic Defense College will be situated in Tartu, Estonia, and a study program
starts in the middle of 1999. The school will prepare Baltic and international mid-career
officers with a perspective to serve in policy-making positions in the national defense
structures, joint international (Baltic) military projects, at NATO Headquarters, and other
international staff working according to NATO procedures. Sweden has taken a lead in
the coordination of the project and professors will come overwhelmingly from sponsor
countries (See also the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, 1998).
C. FROM LONDON INITIATIVE TO BALTIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE
As the Western assistance to the re-establishment of the Baltic defense forces was
miscellaneous, it often faced troubles in ensuring that the resources drafted for this
purpose are spent rationally and effectively. These experiences led to the recognition that
these efforts need to be coordinated between sponsor-countries. The first attempt towards
coordination has been made by the initiative of the United Kingdom, who in 1995
initiated the process called London Initiative. This process attempted to coordinate the
assistance of sponsor-countries in so-called "defense management issues."
Unfortunately, the definition of defense management remained itself unclear. Initially, the
London Initiative was mainly focused on defense issues dealt with by Ministries of
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Defense, including issues of the budget, defense planning and policy, defense resources
management.
Several meetings were organized, but without remarkable progress. At the end of
1996, Norway made a proposal to arrange a special working group, which would be
extended to all possible defense assistance and cooperation areas. Norway's proposal was
followed by Denmark's similar plans, which tried to give additionally a security
dimension to the new cooperation form. This process, later called the Baltic Security
Assistance (BALTSEA), started on April 10, 1997 in Oslo, where general guidelines of
the new program were decided. The first official meeting in the framework of BALTSEA
was conducted in September 1997 in Copenhagen. The main issue concerned the creation
of a special database about the military assistance to the Baltic states, which will be
established with the coordination of Norway.
BALTSEA does not have a formal structure and a basic document. It consists of
regular meetings twice a year, led by the high officials of the Ministries of Defense of the
participant countries. The representatives of the respective Foreign Ministries will
participate in the fall sessions of the program. In the meeting of fall 1998, the Military
Working Group (MWG) was founded. The structure of the BALTSEA is similar to other
Baltic projects now. As the main sessions will be more concentrated on political issues,
then the MWG will work on a practical level, to implement the guidelines of general
meetings (See also Practical Regional Cooperation in PfP, 1997).
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D. TWO DIMENSIONS OF BALTSEA
There are two dimensions in the BALTSEA process: sponsor-countries and
supported countries. This process can be described as a two-dimensional project. A first
dimension is the assistance to the Baltic countries in their rebuilding-process of defense
forces. A second dimension is the enhancement of military cooperation between the
parties. The contribution of the sponsor-countries to the overall defense assistance
support, and the role of the Baltic countries in this process, are described below, on the
basis of the minutes of the BALTSEA meeting held on 8 December 1997, in Tallinn,
Estonia.
Denmark is a leading nation in the BALTBAT project. It is remarkable that the
Danish contribution to the rebuilding of the armed forces in the Baltic states has been
extensive, involving almost all areas. Denmark is focused on different fields of training,
especially short-term training. Bilateral cooperation plans include the largest number of
activities.
Norway has been an initiator of the BALTSEA, and a leading nation for the
BALTNET project. Within the framework of BALTSEA, Norway is responsible for the
development of Baltic databases. These databases should indicate the information about
the defense assistance to the Baltic states.
Sweden increased its participation in the defense cooperation with the Baltic states
since the end of 1997 when the Swedish Parliament approved new defense policy
guidelines, which paid special attention to enhancement of military cooperation with the
Baltic states. The Swedish contribution includes training of army and navy cadets,
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training of the BALTBAT antitank platoon and participation in the Nordic-Baltic
exercises "Nordic Peace 1998." Latvia is the main recipient of the Swedish military
assistance.
Finland has paid relatively more attention to the cooperation with Estonia and has
been critized by the other sponsor countries for that policy. Finnish-Estonian cooperation
plans emphasize the training of Estonians in Finland and the work of Finnish defense
specialists in Estonia.
Poland's security and defense cooperation with the Baltic states is formed into
two separate pillars. First, extensive bilateral cooperation with Lithuania has been
developed very effectively during the last years. The Polish-Lithuanian Peacekeeping
Battalion is the result of enhanced cooperation. Second, Poland is also interested to
enlarge cooperation with Latvia and Estonia. Annual cooperation plans with Latvia and
Estonia include five joint activities.
Germany is a leading nation of the BALTRON project. The German training
assistance for the Baltic states has also been remarkable. Annual cooperation plans with
three Baltic states involve 32 different activities. Medical service and personnel
management are mentioned as key areas for assistance.
The United Kingdom has been a traditional ally for the Baltic states since their
independent statehood in 1918. It is important that the United Kingdom was the first
country that raised the issue of coordination regarding the assistance to the Baltic
countries and was the initiator of the 'London Initiative' process. The British assistance
includes attachment of British Civil Servants to Baltic MoDs, language and NCO-
training.
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The United States has paid a lot of attention to the issue of Baltic security, which
has been formed into the Baltic Action Plan, and the signing of the Baltic Charter on
January 1998. The present cooperation gives priority to the BALTNET initiative. The
United States will also support the IDAB project, which is a Western defense consultation
working group for Baltic states, including retired high-level officers from sponsor
countries.
France has participated in the Baltic cooperation since 1994 when the first annual
bilateral cooperation plan was signed. Cooperation has remained at the same level, at 10-
15 bilateral activities within a year. There are no signs that this cooperation will be
enhanced because the French security concerns are linked to Mediterranean and southern
part of Europe. Nevertheless, cooperation plans embrace language training and officer
training courses in France.
Netherlands pays more attention to the BALTRON project.
Belgium joined the BALTSEA only in the late 1997. Belgium's contribution is
similar to Netherlands and is based on forwarding experiences from Netherlands-
Belgium joint navy.
Switzerland participated in the BALTSEA since 1997. The main contribution of
this country is connected with defense policy courses and officer and NCO training. The
participation of Switzerland has been especially remarkable because of their traditional
neutrality and non-involvement into the Europeanization process.
Iceland has been an observer at the BALTSEA meetings. Although Iceland has no
independent defense capability, she has been one of the maine supporters of the Baltic
states in their integration in European and Transatlantic structures.
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Canada participated in the first meetings of the London Initiative. Because of
internal problems related with the illegal arms trade operations, Canada withdrew from
the political coordination of the Baltic assistance programs. However, the practical
assistance through the MTAP (Military Training Assistance Program) continued, and
recently Canada rejoined the BALTSEA group.
Baltic countries have determined their responsibilities in coordinating
international Baltic projects. Estonia coordinates the BALTRON and BALTDEFCOL
projects, Latvia is a host-country for the BALTBAT project, and Lithuania is the Baltic
coordinator for the BALTNET project. According to development plans for the near
future, Estonia plans to raise the defense budget to 2% of GNP, establish a Combat
Readiness Force, and the Rapid Readiness Force. Latvia's plans are focused to the
changes in defense structures in which Land Forces are planned to serve within the
National Guard Structure. Lithuania plans to reorganize force structure and including
streamlining the command and control system, developing procedures for officer
selection, centralizing basic training, establishing a combat service support school, and
developing the military academy (See also Minutes of the BALTSEA Meeting, 1997).
E. GOING AHEAD
Further development of BALTSEA seems to take the key role for adjusting both
parties of this process, the Baltic countries and sponsor states. This process will continue
in order to guarantee rational use of defense and security assistance, and involve the
initiative of a broader security dimension including the other aspects of assistance beyond
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purely military ones. The main goal of BALTSEA is primarily to establish reliable armed
forces in the Baltic States which can be tools in guaranteeing the sovereignty of these
countries, and, of course, to promote democracy, stability, and cooperation in the whole
Baltic Sea region, and Europe, and last but not least, have a certain influence on global
issues.
There are two ways to further develop BALTSEA. First, BALTSEA is an
enhanced model of its predecessor, the London Initiative, and deals mainly with technical
adjustment of cooperation plans, coordination between bilateral cooperation plans, and
exchange of information. Second, BALTSEA is also a forum for political consultation
with the aim to elaborate common understanding in different defense and security related
issues. As the project is still young, it is rather difficult to predict which way will
dominate in the future.
The BALTSEA is not only an international assistance project, but it also promotes
defense cooperation between different countries. For the future, it would be useful for
Baltic countries to join such regional cooperation elements with other larger cooperation
security arrangements, first of all PfP cooperation, but also WEU, OSCE, UN initiatives,
regional cooperation and other possible cooperative security arrangements. The
BALTSEA program represents a positive example of cooperative security that brings
countries with different institutional background together in building up a stable security
environment in the region. The program is under way and it has not open all its ressources
yet. Nevertheless, the program fits exactly with the general political needs of the modern
era described in the first chapters, if there is the interest and concern about security on the
the Baltic Sea, and partners cooperate in solving the respective security dilemmas.
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VI. DIFFERENT PATHS FOR COOPERATION IN ENHANCING
SECURITY ON THE BALTIC SEA
A. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION
As mentioned before, the Baltic Sea region's security dynamics have changed.
During the Cold War it was a clearly distinguished potential conflict area for the
superpowers. It has subsequently become a multipolar cooperation environment. The
countries of the region are linked with each other through different institutions,
agreements, and bilateral cooperation arrangements. These processes, started for the most
part in the European political landscape in the 1990s, have created new possibilities for
deepening the positive outcomes of regionalization in the Baltic Sea region.
Still, changing European realities could support regionalization and create
new ties between people living on the shores of the Baltic Sea. Poland,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are on the waiting list of the European
Union. In the long perspective, a Nordic-Baltic imagined community could
develop as a broader regional identity encompassing all the Baltic Sea
countries. In ten or twenty years' time, expanding and deepening
economic, environmental, political and cultural cooperation may well
contribute to a sense of belonging together: a new region in a new Europe.
(Vihalemm in Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 162)
A lengthy confrontation with the involvement of local and global great powers has
been replaced by a strong emergence of cooperative security.
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The Baltic Sea region includes a remarkable number of small states 14 with their
specific security concerns. Small states tend to be more interested in collective security
arrangements than are larger states because their military capability makes it difficult for
them to maintain their sovereignty in potential conflicts with stronger neighbors. "Only
rarely can European small states point to a period in which their security dilemmas were
alleviated and their security desires were largely satisfied." (Gartner and Sens in Peters,
1996, p. 201). Therefore, small states frequently support the idea of multinational
institutionalization. In the current European security environment, only two institutions
seem to have the potential as alliances for collective defense. The traditional Western
military alliance, NATO, has demonstrated its capability already. However, especially in
the post-Cold War era, the tendencies to seek security and defense pillars in the
framework of the European Union, and using for that purpose the organization of the
Western European Union, are increasing.
The role of another Transeurasian security institution, the OSCE, in this particular
region has remained secondary, at least from the Baltic regional aspect. The OSCE has
been particularly involved only with the Russian minority questions in Estonia and
Latvia. This is the reason why the OSCE option was excluded from possible regional
security options. Similarly, the United Nations has not been involved with the Northen
European issues due to the lack of serious conflicts. At the same time, the contribution of
Baltic Sea countries to UN conflict resolution and their participation in peacekeeping
14
It is difficult to determine which states should be placed in this category. "The set of European
states we refer to here excludes the European great powers and the so-called 'middle states' of Italy and
Turkey, as well as ceremonial or microstates such as Monaco or Liechtenstein." (Peters, 1996, p. 179).
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missions has been remarkable. Nordic countries especially have had a long tradition in
peace operations.
Table 7 illustrates how European and Transatlantic institutions are presented in
the Baltic Sea region.
Table 7. Institutionalization in the Baltic Sea Region
State NATO/PfP WEU Other institutions
Germany NATO; EAPC member EU; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Iceland NATO; EAPC associate member EFTA/EEA;NC; CBSS; OSCE;
EC
Norway NATO; EAPC associate member EFTA/EEA; NC;CBSS; OSCE;
EC
Denmark NATO; EAPC observer EU 15;NC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Finland PfP + ID 16;EAPC observer EU; NC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Sweden PfP; EAPC observer, EU; NC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Estonia PfP + ID; EAPC associate partner BA/BC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Latvia PfP + ID; EAPC associate partner BA/BC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Lithuania PfP + ID; EAPC associate partner BA/BC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Russia PfP, NRPJC; EAPC - CIS; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Poland NATO/PfP (becoming
member); EAPC
associate partner OSCE; EC; CBSS
The enlargement of security institutions has had a positive impact in diminishing
security fears. When states cooperate with each other, this helps to avoid the emergence
'5 Except Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
'" Participants of the Intensified Dialogue between NATO and partner countries ( 16+1 ).
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of security dilemmas. Such dilemmas arise when the security concerns of one state
depend on the activities of a neighbor country. According to Clive Archer, a British
political scientist, cooperative security "is the type of security arrangement, which
represents an attempt to maintain security by consensus. Here the emphasis is less on
identifying an aggressor and more on identifying problems that can lead to conflict and
then attempting to resolve them collectively." (Archer in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p.
120). The Baltic Sea countries belong to different institutions, and there are few examples
of regional collective security arrangements (NATO cooperation in the region; Baltic
cooperation; Polish-Lithuanian cooperation; Danish-German cooperation). There is still
no interest (and no acknowledgement of the practical needs) in building distinctive
collective security institutions for the entire region. The existing frameworks are able to
cover the main security concerns of the countries. However, the establishment of a
regional security forum, with the purpose of mitigating possible interstate tensions, would
be desirable, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States could aspire to this role.
It should not be forgotten that security is much more than the
strengthening of institutions or the expansion of military cooperation.
These are of course important, and it is difficult to envision a stable
security environment without either. However, stability in Europe
cannot be achieved solely through institutions and military actions that
respond to outbreaks of inter-state or intra-state violence. Peace and
security in Europe will to a large extent depend on the ability of
European countries to develop structures for conflict prevention.
(Gartner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 181)
The security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region is mainly related to the instability of
Russia, the major military power in the region. Therefore, the other countries have
attempted to solve their security problems by joining with Transatlantic and European
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security institutions. The Baltic countries and Poland applied for membership in NATO
and the EU. Sweden and Finland joined the EU and enhanced their security cooperation
with NATO.
Territorial and ethnic conflicts tend to be among the most difficult interstate
quarrels to solve. Changes in territory and population were remarkable in the Baltic Sea
region after World War II. However, in contrast to the Balkans and other crisis areas in
the contemporary world, violent international conflicts did not emerge in the Baltic Sea
region. Today, with the sole exception of Russia, all the countries in the region can be
considered stable democracies. Francis Fukuyama has emphasized the importance of the
internal policies of particular countries for the international political environment. In
1992, when a member of the U.S. State Department, he wrote, "while the peoples of the
Soviet Transcaucasus have already been guilty of acts of unspeakable brutality, there is
little evidence to date that the nationalisms of the northern half of Eastern Europe -
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states - will develop in an aggressive
direction incompatible with liberalism. This is not to say that existing states like
Czechoslovakia may not fracture, or that Poland and Lithuania will not have border
disputes. But this need not lead to the maelstrom of political violence characteristic of
other areas, and will be counteracted by pressures for economic integration." (Fukuyama,
1992, p. 273). Some of these factors, in the Baltic Sea region, are discussed below, and
presented in Table 8 and Table 9.
The most prominent territorial changes took place during World War II. Germany
lost huge territories, including old German areas like East Pomerania, Silesia, and East
Prussia, to Poland and Russia. Finland lost some border regions in Karelia and Northern
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Finland to Russia. Estonia and Latvia suffered from minor territorial cessions to Russia,
and Poland lost its eastern part to the Soviet Union (now Belarus and Ukraine).
Table 8. International Disputes in the Baltic Sea Region
Border conflicts Estonia/Russia (Land border: Petseri and Narva region)
Latvia/Russia (Land border: Abrene/Potalovo region)
Lithuania/Russia (Maritime and riparian boundary: Kaliningrad region)
Latvia/Estonia and Latvia/Lithuania (Maritime border)
Norway/Russia (Maritime boundary: Svalbard)
Denmark/Iceland/UK/lreland (Rockall continental shelf)
Lithuania/Belarus (Border demarcation)
The minority issues have not caused violent clashes in the Baltic Sea region.
Nations around the Baltic Sea have practiced living together successfully for centuries.
The drastic shifts in interstate migration took part during and after World War II. The
historic Baltic German minority was forced to leave the Baltic countries. The Estonian
Swedes returned to their Fatherland in 1944, despite the fact that they had lived in the
Estonian territory since the 12th and 13 th centuries. Many Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians left their countries because of the Soviet occupation, and now, for example,
there is a relatively big Estonian community in Sweden. At the same time, a remarkable
number of Russians moved to the Baltic countries. For example, the proportion of
Russians in Estonia grew from 8% of the total population in 1934 to 30% in 1989. Due to
territorial changes, many Polish, Finnish and German people were forced to go back to
their national territories.
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These changes actually created the preconditions for serious ethnic conflicts.
Russians in the Baltic states who enjoyed a status of dominant nation in the Soviet Union,
found themselves a minority in the reborn independent countries. A huge German
minority stayed in Poland but, as in many Communist countries, they were not allowed to
identify themselves as Germans for many years and were described in the official
statistics as Poles. The Polish minority in Lithuania felt uncomfortable in a situation in
which they had minority status in a Lithuanian-dominated country. 17
Table 9. Baltic Minorities in the Territories of Other Baltic Sea
Countries 18
Danish 50,000 Germany; 35,000 Sweden; 12,000 Norway; 7,830 Greenland.
Estonians 60,000 Sweden; 56,000 Russia; 6,000 Finland; 3,000 Latvia.
Finnish 443,000 Sweden; 31,570 Russia; 16,622 Estonia; 12,000 Norway.
Germans 1,400,000 Poland, 896,000 Russia; 23,000 Denmark.
Latvians 29,000 Russia; 8,000 Germany; 6,000 Sweden; 5,000 Lithuania; 2,000 Estonia.
Lithuanians 67,000 Russia; 35,000 Latvia; 1 1,500 Poland; 2,205 Estonia.
Norwegians 28,000 Sweden.
Polish 258,000 Lithuania; 241,000 Germany; 94,000 Russia; 57,000 Latvia.
Russians 861,600 Latvia; 474,834 Estonia; 360,000 Germany; 344,000 Lithuania; 60,000
Poland; 10,000 Finland; 3,000 Norway.
Swedish 296,000 Finland; 21,000 Norway.
1
' Specific problems are connected with non-state nations: Inuits in Greenland, Faroes in the Faroe
Islands, the Sami people in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia, numerous small Finno-Ugric nations in
Russia and so forth.
'° Data is presented in the Ethnologue website:
http://www.sil.org/ethnologue/countries/Europe.html , Internet.
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Territorial and population changes constitute a minor security dilemma in this
region. There is no evidence that it will develop into a serious interstate conflict.
B. NATO/PFP OPTION
Through the PfP program, NATO has already reached Northern Europe. We
should not underestimate the importance of NATO, not only in guaranteeing security for
its member states, but also in promoting democracy and cooperation in the Western
cultural hemisphere. Zbigniew Brzezinski has recently noted that "without NATO, it is
most unlikely - for the same reasons - that the EC and now the EU would have ever
come into being." (Brzezinski, 1998, p. 13). After the Cold War, NATO became a more
important political player in the Baltic region. The strengthening of NATO's position in
the region is reflected by the reunification of Germany, by the approval of Poland as a
new member of NATO, and by the active PfP cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Some
studies have argued that in the further enlargement of NATO the Allies should not
concentrate only on the southeastern flank of Europe, but pay more attention to Northern
Europe. Brzezinski suggested that in a second round of enlargement NATO might pursue
a two-dimensional course - one country from the south (possibly Slovenia), and one
country from the north (possibly Lithuania) (Brzezinski, 1998, pp. 16-17).
Due to its historically minor role in this area, and the absence of violent conflicts,
NATO did not develop separate collective defense structures in the Baltic Sea region.
After the reorganization of the NATO structure in 1994, Norway belonged to the
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AFNORTHWEST command chain in High Wycombe, in Great Britain. Denmark,
together with Germany, is under the AFCENT command in Brunssum, the Netherlands.
Since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has been very active in developing
security relations around the Baltic Sea. Together with Iceland, Denmark has been
advocate of the Baltic states in their integration with the European structures. Denmark
has also started to pay enhanced attention to security and defense cooperation with
Germany and Poland. The latter has recently been accepted as a new member of NATO,
and will probably belong to the same command as Denmark and Germany.
The official policies of Sweden and Finland still reject NATO membership.
However, there are tendencies to consider such membership in the future. Finland
especially has taken several serious steps to come closer to NATO. A study conducted in
Finland in 1995 concluded that there is no immediate need to join NATO because of the
lack of threats. At the same time, Finland has promoted cooperation with NATO through
existing programs like PfP and PARP. Finland also decided to participate in the
Intensified Dialogue process which is a special mechanism for regulating relations and
cooperation between NATO and applicant countries. "We have observed that Finland
applied for EU membership in the wake of the Swedish application in fear of otherwise
being isolated as a gray area between the EU and Russia. In view of the difference in
security outlook, one might entertain the possibility of Finland being more interested in
NATO membership than Sweden." (Brundtland in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p. 29).
Many prominent Finnish and Swedish diplomats and researchers (for example
Max Jacobsson and Ingemar Dorfer) have made statements supporting NATO
membership for their countries (Dorfer, 1997, p. 84). The non-alignment policy of
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Finland and Sweden does not mean that these countries do not recognize the positive role
of NATO in stabilizing the post-Cold War world. They are generally not against NATO
enlargement to the Baltic states. "Swedish Defense Minister Bjorn von Sydow thinks that
regional security would increase if the Baltic States joined NATO and that Kaliningrad is
not a problem because Russian sovereignty there is uncontested even though it would
then be sandwiched between two NATO members, Lithuania and Poland." (Blank, 1998,
p. 65). NATO enlargement to the Baltic countries, with Sweden and Finland remaining
outside of NATO's framework, might cause another security dilemma. If the NATO flag
was hoisted in the Baltic states, in these circumstances, Sweden and Finland would enjoy
NATO's security umbrella without any obligation to NATO.
NATO enlargement to the North has not been discussed much yet. While Russia
continues to treat NATO enlargement as a threat to its security, the possible membership
of Finland and the Baltic states will change the security environment in the region a great
deal. "Although Danish - and some German - leaders speak about the desirability of
NATO eventually enlarging to the North, many in the Alliance might be skeptical about,
if not opposed to, the prospect of Finland in NATO, given its 1,200-km border with
Russia. Others, however, would support the entry of Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic
states as a Northern package - but only an appropriate future date." (Asmus and Nurick,
1995, p. 136). From the perspective of the Baltic states, the accession of Sweden and
Finland. is highly desirable. "According to other schools of thought, Baltic security would
be enhanced by Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO; then NATO's shadow
would fall over the Baltic states." (Dorfer, 1997, p. 84). The new geopolitical situation
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eliminates obstacles set up by Russia, even though Moscow has constantly demanding the
buffer-zone between its frontiers and NATO frontiers.
NATO's PfP program, is currently the only military cooperation forum covering
the Baltic Sea region entirely. NATO members such as Denmark, Iceland, Germany, and
Norway (and Poland in the near future), together with the Baltic states, which have
demonstrated their readiness to join NATO at the first possible opportunity, form a
considerable stronghold in the Baltic Sea region. Sweden and Finland, though officially
still uninterested in NATO membership, have actually started an extensive program of
cooperation with NATO. Even Russia is a participant in the PfP program, although the
official statements from Russia are still frequently oriented towards bipolar opposition.
In this respect, NATO can offer an even more acceptable regional cooperation
formula through its enhanced PfP program, with the EAPC as a political forum. It would
be difficult to imagine Russia as a member of the EU, but theoretically, in the absence of
opposing alliances, NATO membership for Russia would be achievable in the long run, if
democratization in Russia ultimately succeeds. "Moreover, Russia, if it is to be a truly
European national state and not a nostalgic craver of empire, must accept the fact that
democratic European states do wish to coalesce in a joint security framework with
America, and that sovereign right cannot be denied them." (Brzezinski, 1998, p. 17).
NATO enlargement is related to the cooperative security dilemma. Countries try
to avoid remaining in a "gray zone" between potential adversaries, and make attempts to
protect their security interests in the framework of collective security and defense
institutions. It would be very dangerous for European security to set up Russia as a world
power again with its global interests and to stop the NATO enlargement because of
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Russia's security fears. One of NATO's main responsibilities is to find a prudent way to
diminish these security fears and to show Moscow that the NATO enlargement process
generally will guarantee peace and stability in Europe. A positive solution will include the
involvement of Russia in cooperative security arrangements, which take Russia away
from the outsider's role.
C. EU/WEU OPTION
At the moment, the EU/WEU option as a possible security arrangement for the
Baltic Sea region tends to be very controversial and complicated. Despite the fact that the
European Union has recently extended its borders in Northern Europe to Sweden and
Finland, the security cooperation in the EU framework tends to be in the background.
Nordic countries traditionally support separation of the WEU from the EU, and represent
the orthodox view in the EU, which stresses economic and cultural cooperation, and
separates security and defense policy pillars from the content of the EU. "Orthodox
NATO nations such as the United Kingdom will not allow the WEU to be integrated fully
into the EU." (Dorfer, 1997, p. 74). 19
Sweden and Finland have often supported the British position. Their negative
attitude towards common European Union's security and defense options was related to
concerns about losing a traditional non-alignment policy. Nevertheless, in the new
19 The eligibility of the EU members to join the WEU has caused concerns in some NATO
countries due to the so-called "back-door commitment" risk. A number of the Allies (including the United
States) support a principle of "congruence" - that WEU members should be also NATO members. In the
case of the Baltic states, it causes another security dilemma, if they are not admitted to NATO because of
Russia's claims. (See also Yost, 1998, p. 379).
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security environment both countries have started to reassess their positions. For example,
on October 8, 1996, Sweden and Finland suggested an amendment in which they
proposed to enhance the EU's role in certain fields of security cooperation. "The Union's
role in the areas of crisis management that require military means, that is to say, certain
types of humanitarian assignments and peace-keeping efforts need to be strengthened.
Sweden and Finland therefore want to give the EU enhanced possibilities of utilizing the
entire spectrum of instruments needed for effective and credible action in this area."
(Lindstrom, 1997, p. 17). Therefore, we may conclude that Sweden and Finland are
moving slowly towards an acknowledgement of the European Union's possible utility in
security and defense cooperation. They do not seem to be ready to join the WEU in the
near future, but they are striving to make a contribution to the issue of European Security
and Defense Identity (See also European Security and Finnish Defense, 1997, p. 20).
Norway and Iceland have remained outside of the EU. They have become
members of the European Economic Area, and they are members of NATO. Therefore, it
is doubtful whether they would promote a separate, purely European security cooperation.
"Norway is also the country where the internal situation makes EU membership most
problematic. This follows from the nature of norskhed (Norwegianness). Norway is
founded on the belief that it is possible to keep the whole territory populated, that there is
a fisher on each island and farmer on each fjell. This would hardly be possible in the EU."
(Buzan and Waever in 0berg, 1992, p. 96). Denmark is a member of the European
Union, but its oversea territories (Greenland and the Faroe Islands) are not. Denmark did
not become a member of the WEU, and in terms of defense and security cooperation
seems to have the same positions as Norway and Iceland.
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Germany, currently the only full member of the WEU on the Baltic Sea, is trying
to promote both security and defense pillars, transatlantic NATO and European
EU/WEU, simultaneously. The positions of Poland and the Baltic states in this respect are
close to Germany's. The EU started negotiations with Poland and Estonia about their
joining the EU in the "first enlargement round." Latvia and Lithuania are willing to
follow them. Russia's official policy is more tolerant towards EU enlargement than
NATO enlargement. It would be very difficult to imagine Russia as a member of the
European Union. Russia has created a similar institution, the CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States), and it seems impossible to assimilate these two institutions. As the
security pillar is not a primary form of cooperation in the European Union, and economic
and cultural cooperation dominate, the exclusion of Russia from the EU does not increase
the risk of a security dilemma emerging.
Despite all these factors that have encouraged a cautious attitude towards
European integration among the Nordic nations, the "European" EU/WEU option is still a
viable way to satisfy security concerns in the region. In this respect, Finland's proposal to
create a "Nordic dimension" within the framework of the European Union will be a
positive step in enhancing regional cooperation, which later might also embrace the
security cooperation. 20
20 The concept of the "Nordic dimension" has been proposed to the EU by Finland with the
purpose of enhancing regional interstate cooperation in the framework of the EU. The meaning of the
"Nordic dimension" is described in the Finnish "Government's Report to the Parliament. 14 February
1995." [ONLINE], http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-fi/rep-fi.html , Internet.
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D. NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT
The golden era of the neutrality for small states was probably before World War
II. On the basis of both World Wars' experiences, it can be concluded that this security
measure was not effective. "The disadvantage of the neutrality option is that it relies
heavily on prevailing conditions for its maintenance and ultimately on the willingness of
other states to honor it." (Gartner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 194). If the geographical
location allowing, neutrality was pursued by fighting nations (the most prominent
examples were Sweden and Switzerland), but very often small countries have been
occupied as a function of the military strategy of their bigger neighbors.
Neutrality has been a desirable security option for the Nordic and Baltic countries.
Before World War II, Denmark and Norway, as well as the Baltic countries, pursued
policies of official neutrality. However, Norway and Denmark were occupied by
Germany in 1940, and the Soviet Union established its authority in Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. The latter occupation lasted until 1991 . The failure of neutrality was the reason
for seeking other security options for these countries. Norway and Denmark joined
NATO in 1949. The Baltic countries have been active in seeking collective security and
defense options since reestablishing their sovereignty in 1991.
Sweden was not involved directly in World War II, and for that reason plus
traditional antipathy to military involvement, continued its neutrality through the Cold
War period. Finland, at the same time, suffered because of its alliance with Germany in
World War II, and was forced to turn its policy towards neutrality. After the Cold War,
both countries, Sweden and Finland, moved their security policies from neutrality to non-
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alignment, seeking cooperative security options which would exclude direct involvement
with collective defense alliances.
Neutrality and non-alignment were frequently recommended as an appropriate
security policy arrangement for new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe.
However, after the recent changes in the European political order, and the establishment
of cooperation-oriented institutions, it is hard to see a place for neutrality. In the past,
small states often turned to neutrality, with the purpose of avoiding conflicts. In the
modern era, the best guarantee of security is involvement with collective and cooperative
security arrangements. Today, considering global changes, neutrality and non-alignment
may be a transitional stage on the way to collective and cooperative security institutions.
E. REGIONAL SECURITY OPTIONS
Regionalization is a valuable element in seeking a stable security environment and
solving different security dilemmas, but it is not an elixir which removes all problems. In
security matters, regionalization is difficult to pursue outside of overall security concerns.
"The impact of these [regional] organizations should not be overestimated. While these
organizations may relax tensions and improve the political climate, they do not, and
cannot solve the fundamental security dilemmas of small states. Regional organizations
are limited in scope and resources, and cannot address the larger political, military, or
social agendas confronting Europe." (Gartner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 194).
The regional security cooperation options for the Baltic Sea region have been of
considerable interest to Russia. In 1997, President Yeltsin proposed to promote military
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cooperation and to conclude a security pact linking the Baltic Sea countries. "Neither the
Nordic nations nor the Baltic states are interested in a regionalization of Baltic security."
(Dorfer, 1997, p. 83). Yeltsin's proposal was not very enthusiastically received by other
Baltic Sea countries. Russia has remained outside the main cooperative and collective
regional security arrangements, but has been very active in seeking new regional security
options.
Finland and Sweden have made some "soft security" initiatives made in the Baltic
Sea region. For example, in a proposal drafted in April 1998 after the meeting of Nordic
Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, Lena Hjelm-Wallen and
Tarja Halonen, made a statement about strengthening regional security cooperation in
such matters as "crime-prevention work, border guarding functions, rescue services and
civil and military traffic, expanded training in peacekeeping activities and regional and
deeper cooperation within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council."21 At
the same time, both Ministers gave a negative evaluation of the Russian proposals and
expressed their wish to promote overall defense and security cooperation within the main
European structures.
The Baltic tegion offers a variety of security options and preferences. We can
conclude that it is still difficult to establish common collective security arrangements in
the region. At the same time, cooperative security formulas in the region could be
acceptable for the majority of the countries. "Thus, it seems important to articulate the
contours of the emerging Baltic Sea region in terms of a cooperative and 'wider'
21





understanding of security." (Waever and Joenniemi in Wellmann, 1994, p. 52). The PfP
cooperation, Baltic Security Assistance program, and extensive bilateral security and
defense cooperation could provide a solution for the security dilemma today.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This analysis indicates that security cooperation can play a significant role in
avoiding security dilemmas. The purpose of regional security cooperation is, first, to
establish a stable security environment, and , second, to build up effective cooperative
and cooperative security arrangements. The post-Cold War security dilemmas in the
Baltic Sea region are based to a great extent on the security environment shaped during
the Cold War. There are basically four main security concerns in the Baltic Sea region:
• The Baltic question. The Baltic states have often remained in the spheres of influence
of their stronger neighbors. However, the current general orientation to cooperation
does not give any reason to establish "buffer-zones." One possible option is to delay
the second round of NATO enlargement until the EU is ready to enlarge.
• Instability in Russia. Russia is probably the main security concern in the region. If
democracy ultimately wins in Russia, and Russia becomes a more stable country, this
will help create a "zone of peace" in the Baltic Sea region.
• Questions connected with arms control issues and CFE and START-II. Russia has
demanded modifications in the CFE treaty, which could increase Russia's military
presence and capability in the region.
• Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) area. The highly militarized Russian enclave on the Baltic
Sea creates security concerns not only in neighboring Poland and Lithuania, but in all
the countries of the region. There is no practical need to preserve Russia's military
outpost outside its main territory in an era of cooperation and mutual interdependence.
The escape from the security dilemma depends on the success of the development
of different cooperative security arrangements in the Baltic Sea region. This paper has
analyzed some special frameworks which offer opportunities for promoting collective
security arrangements. The NATO/PfP framework emerged as a serious cooperative
security option after the Partnership for Peace program was established in 1994. The PfP
made it possible to include in the security cooperation former neutral countries like
Finland and Sweden, former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, and former Soviet
republics, including the Baltic states and Russia. The reunification of Germany and the
imminent membership of Poland in the Alliance, have made the NATO flag more visible
in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic states have applied for NATO membership, and
Sweden and Finland have deepened cooperation with NATO. Even Russia participates at
a modest level in the PfP program, although its official policy has remained relatively
hostile towards NATO. This statement should be qualified, however, because Russian
forces are participating in the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia, and dialogue continues in the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.
The EU/WEU option has some positive outcomes. The WEU has created a four-
level formula of cooperation: member, associate member, observer, or associate partner.
However, of all the members of the Council of Baltic Sea States, Germany is currently
the only full member of the WEU. Denmark is a member of NATO and the EU but has
decided to be an observer in the WEU. We can distinguish two standpoints regarding the
enhancement of security and defense cooperation in the framework of the EU or the
WEU. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland represent an orthodox view in security policy: that
transatlantic cooperation through NATO is sufficient and there is no need to pursue a
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distinct European Security and Defense Identity through the WEU and the EU. Other
countries do not exclude the European option. Sweden and Finland, as members of the
EU but not NATO, would be especially interested in the promotion of the European
Security and Defense Identity. However, they attach a meaning to the ESDI that differs
from that favored by a majority of EU members. The ESDI would be an option for the
Baltic states, which face obstacles in joining NATO because of Russia's opposition. At
the same time, Russia seems to be more tolerant regarding their membership in the EU or
even the WEU.
In recent years, different security cooperation arrangements have developed
rapidly in the Baltic Sea region. In addition to traditional forms of regional cooperation
like Nordic cooperation, Baltic cooperation, or Nordic-Baltic cooperation, new bilateral
or multilateral cooperative or collective security arrangements have emerged. At
Denmark's initiative, extensive Danish-German-Polish defense cooperation has started.
One goal of this cooperation is to prepare Poland for NATO membership. Recently, this
cooperation has extended to the Baltic states. Finland has paid a lot of attention to the
establishment of capable Defense Forces in Estonia, and Poland and Lithuania have
pursued extensive defense cooperation with the same goals. The development of special
programs in guaranteeing the security of the Baltic states has often gained remarkable
success. The BALTSEA project supplements these efforts with a security policy
dimension and helps to coordinate assistance from Western countries, simultaneously
making progress in multinational security and defense cooperation in the Baltic Sea
region.
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The neutrality option, which was popular among the Nordic and Baltic countries
before World War II, lost its credibility in the war. After World War II, only Sweden and
Finland remained neutral. Sweden was the only country in the region that was not a
belligerent during the war. Stockholm tried to establish a Scandinavian Defense Union
together with Denmark and Norway, but this effort failed, and Denmark and Norway
joined NATO. Finland, owing in part to its experience during World War II, was forced
by terms of its peace agreement with the U.S.S.R. to turn its policy towards neutrality.
After the Cold War, Sweden and Finland moved their security policies from neutrality to
non-alignment, seeking cooperative security options which would exclude collective
defense commitments and direct involvement with alliances such as NATO.
Nevertheless, today, in the absence of bipolarity and antagonistic alliances in that region,
the neutrality option seems impractical and irrelevant. If Sweden and Finland joined
NATO, this would change the security environment on the Eastern coast of the Baltic
Sea, and probably make the accession of the Baltic states to NATO easier to accomplish.
The NATO and the EU enlargements must include the Baltic Sea region, in so far
as it is possible.22 The enlargement of security institutions like NATO must include all
democracies that are able to contribute to regional peace and stability and that are willing
to cooperate in this respect. The enlargement of institutions which are mainly based on
economic cooperation, such as the European Union, has certainly firm constraints, which
22 The main difference in NATO and EU enlargement in the Baltic Sea region concerns Russia. In
principle, Russia would be able to join NATO, because it has security interests in Europe and NATO is
mainly European security institution. In the case of EU, the joining of Russia may be more problematic.
Russia participates already in similar institution CIS, and Russia is too large and diverse for the EU to
incorporate.
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are determined by an ability to effectively participate in the common economic and
cultural complex.
Cooperative security dilemmas in the region need a positive solution by building a
stable security environment, and strengthening collective and cooperative security
arrangements. The Baltic Sea region is a compound security complex, in which the
security of each of the Baltic Sea countries depends on the security of others23 . Therefore,
security is a sum of the concerns of all the Baltic Sea nations and no country may apply
for privileges in this respect, including Russia. If any nation sets itself in contrast with
others, and connects democratic institutionalization with its security problems, this
situation may cause instability in the region and a return to the pattern of bipolar
opposition. All the countries in the region, except Russia, are stable democracies today.
Democratic Transatlantic and European institutions, such as NATO and the EU, are the
main guarantees of democracy and regional peace. Therefore, if the enlargement of the
democratic institutions to the countries of the Baltic Sea region is stopped, it might create
insecurity among the excluded nations and they might turn away from democracy.
23 As the security complex, the Baltic Sea region is undivided. For example, the security of Nordic
countries depends on security of Baltic countries and vice versa or the security of Poland depends on
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